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Introduction
At the core of the controversy over mass torts lies a fundamental
question: what justifies collective litigation? The conventional under-
standing of litigation is individualistic, founded on an eighteenth-cen-
tury common-law tradition that "everyone should have his own day in
court."' For this reason, tort law scholars and judges have consistently
asserted that procedures aimed at achieving collective justice in mass
tort cases-such as class actions and aggregative litigation-must be
limited by an individual, process-based right to participation.2 Those
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D., Harvard
Law School. Many thanks to Jon Bauer, Paul Berman, Bethany Beyer, Robert Bone, George
Conk, Anne Dailey, Amanda Frost, Mort Horwitz, Pnina Lahav, Henry Monaghan, Jeremy
Paul, Sachin Pandya, Ariel Porat, Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Alex Stein, and participants in workshops
at the University of Connecticut, Tel Aviv University, and Washington University in St. Louis
School of Law for their thoughtful responses and criticisms, and to Lee Sims and Tom Hemstock
for assistance in collecting research materials. All errors are my own.
1 Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2 See Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 627 (1997) (overturning asbestos
settlement based on concerns regarding rights of individual plaintiffs); Robert G. Bone, Statisti-
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scholars who believe pure collective justice is possible rely solely on
efficiency arguments.3 Modern torts scholarship has thus been limited
to two opposing rationales: individual justice based on autonomy val-
ues or collective justice based on efficiency values.
This Article presents a third argument for collective justice based
on democratic participation values. It urges that we re-envision the
tort trial as a democratic enterprise rather than only an individual's
day in court. This argument draws an analogy to the theory of delib-
erative democracy, which values participation as a means of encourag-
ing public deliberation and believes that contentious issues are best
addressed through deliberative processes.4 Holding public trials and
allowing juries to determine outcomes constitutes a deliberative pro-
cess in which reasoned arguments are presented to citizens who par-
ticipate in decisionmaking.
Although the dichotomy between autonomy and efficiency values
remains the bedrock of mass torts scholarship, trial judges have been
using a procedure that embodies this democratic justification: the bell-
wether trial. A "bellwether" is a sheep that leads a flock, around
whose neck a bell is hung.5 In a bellwether trial procedure, a random
sample of cases large enough to yield reliable results is tried to a jury.
A judge, jury, or participating lawyers use the resulting verdicts as a
basis for resolving the remaining cases. Judges currently use bell-
wether trials informally in mass tort litigation to assist in valuing cases
cal Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a World of Process Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REV. 561,
650 (1993) (concluding that under a rights-based theory sampling is an acceptable form of resolv-
ing mass tort cases only in instances of extreme process scarcity); Lawrence B. Solum, Procedu-
ral Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 183 (2004) (defending process-based rights to participation in
litigation).
3 See, e.g., David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for
Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 853 (2002) (advocating a deterrence rationale for mass
tort cases); Michael J. Saks & Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits
of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815, 851 (1992)
(presenting utilitarian arguments in favor of using sample cases to resolve mass tort cases); Lau-
rens Walker & John Monahan, Sampling Damages, 83 IOWA L. REV. 545, 546 (1998) (presenting
efficiency arguments in favor of statistical adjudication of damages).
4 Although not discussed explicitly, this analysis draws on a rich literature on deliberative
democracy. See generally JAMES S. FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION (1991); AMY
GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? (2004). For a useful sum-
mary of different models of democracy and the arguments favoring and critiquing each, see Amy
Gutmann, Democracy, in A COMPANION TO CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 411-21
(Robert E. Goodin & Philip Pettit eds., 1993).
5 2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 94 (2d ed. 1989); see also In re Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,
109 F.3d 1016, 1019 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating that the term "is derived from the ancient practice of
belling a wether (a male sheep) selected to lead his flock").
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and to encourage settlement.6 Instituted as a formal procedure, bell-
wether trials offer an innovative way to achieve collective justice in
mass tort cases because they realize the democratic policies animating
the jury right and the aims of the substantive law. These trials pro-
mote a type of "group typical" justice that is at once participatory and
collective.
The original bellwether was a typical, perhaps particularly docile
sheep who signaled the direction of the flock because he traveled at its
center.7 Bellwether trials also approximate a "typical" case through
averaging. In common usage, the term bellwether refers to a leader or
an indicator of future trends. Bellwether trials also lead procedure in
a new direction, adapting the eighteenth-century institution of the jury
trial to twenty-first century needs for collective justice.
The Article begins with a description of bellwether trials using
three examples: litigation arising out of the tragedy of September
11th, asbestos litigation, and a human rights class action against Ferdi-
nand Marcos, former dictator of the Philippines. These case studies
illustrate the reason that courts have developed innovative procedures
such as bellwether trials to deal with mass tort litigation and provide
some possible permutations of the procedure. They offer insights into
the political economy of litigation that results in statistical adjudica-
tion and prompt us to think more deeply about the group typical jus-
tice that these trials promote.
Part II presents the policy arguments in favor of bellwether trials.
Bellwether trials both realize the policies behind the right to a jury
trial and the aims of the substantive law that procedures are meant to
enforce. This Part begins by demonstrating that the jury right is a
democratic, communal right.8 The jury serves two central political
functions. First, it provides a democratic decisionmaking body, made
6 See, e.g., Silivanch v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 333 F.3d 355, 359-60 (2d Cir. 2003) (af-
firming use of bellwether trial to assist settlement of twenty-two cases involving Legionnaires
disease on a cruise ship); Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 203 F.3d 1190, 1194 (10th Cir. 2000) (affirming
use of bellwether trials to resolve case involving uranium contamination in a community). Infor-
mal bellwether trial procedures were also to be used in two cases that appear at this writing to
have been largely resolved by settlement: the September lth litigation, discussed infra Part I,
and in the recent Vioxx litigation, see Case Management Order No. 3, In re Vioxx Litigation, No.
619 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. May 12, 2004), available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/mass-
tort/vioxx/Vioxx-cmo3.pdf.
7 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the term is used contemptuously when
referring figuratively to individuals. 2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICIONARY 94 (2d ed. 1989).
8 This fact has been asserted but rarely fully analyzed. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Rights
and Their Critics, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 727, 745-46 (1995) (stating that the jury "ensures a
role for the community in adjudicative proceedings").
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up of ordinary citizens, for determining difficult questions to which
there is no generally agreed upon answer. For example, juries lend
legitimacy to the social process of monetizing injury.9 Second, the jury
system provides some measure of protection against systemic bias that
judges may exhibit. The bellwether trial promotes both of these
functions.
Not only do bellwether trials realize the democratic ambitions of
the jury right, they also make possible the realization of the social
aims of substantive tort law including deterrence, publication of
wrongs, and compensation. Collective procedures for resolving mass
torts, such as bellwether trials, rely on group typicality and probabilis-
tic reasoning rather than particularized proof. Although some argue
that group typical justice is fundamentally antithetical to tort law, the
foundations of probabilistic thinking necessary for achieving group
typical justice already exist within the substantive tort regime.
Procedure is an agent for social change as much as the substan-
tive law is. Furthermore, procedures can change the social environ-
ment and thereby alter the policy goals thought to be worth
pursuing.10 Re-envisioning the trial as a democratic enterprise will in-
fluence the choice of substantive ends of law and make it possible to
legitimately decide cases based on group typicality. This change is
necessary in a world of mass industrial harms where individualized
justice is increasingly difficult to achieve.
Part III presents and refutes objections to bellwether trial proce-
dures. These objections fall into three categories: distributional, au-
tonomy-based, and Seventh Amendment objections. Distributional
objections concern the difficulty of determining the variables about
which inferences are to be made, of accurately awarding compensa-
tion based on statistical analysis, and of fairly distributing compensa-
tion among plaintiffs. Autonomy-based objections also form the root
of due process concerns raised by group typical justice. These objec-
tions contend that bellwether trials violate a process-based right to
individual participation. A final constitutional objection to the proce-
dure is that bellwether trials violate the right to a jury trial in civil
9 The assumption here is that the process of monetizing injury is contextual and situated.
See VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD 138-68 (1994) (providing a cultural
history of the evolving value of children's lives and labor in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries).
10 See Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller's Theory of Adjudication and the False Dichotomy Be-
tween Dispute Resolution and Public Law Models of Litigation, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1273, 1276
(1995) (ascribing this position to legal process theorists).
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cases. Each of these objections deserves serious consideration, but
none are fatal to formalizing bellwether trial procedures.
The fourth and final Part proposes a model constitutional bell-
wether trial procedure.
L Bellwether Trials
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, left in their wake
thousands of bereaved families and injured individuals. Congress cre-
ated the September 11th Victims Compensation Fund, an administra-
tive body, to rationalize compensation for these victims.11 By
participating in this expedited, administrative process, the families and
victims of the attacks gave up their right to sue. 12 The fund distributed
$7.049 billion to victims of the terrorist attacks who filed claims.13
Ninety-seven percent of the victims and their families participated in
the administrative procedure instead of pursuing court cases.14 Forty-
one plaintiffs, representing forty-two victims and their families, filed
lawsuits in federal court.15 These forty-one cases were consolidated
before a single judge, the Honorable Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein, in
the Southern District of New York.' 6
Six years after the attacks, these lawsuits were still pending. 17 As
Judge Hellerstein observed, the slow pace of the litigation frustrated
the plaintiffs.1 8 Some of the victims were adamantly against settle-
ment because they wanted the publicity of a trial. 19 But others, the
judge believed, wanted to settle, and the only obstacle to settling those
cases was that the parties could not agree on their monetary value. 20
So he proposed holding bellwether trials for selected plaintiffs who
would volunteer to participate. The trials were to be for damages
only; the jury would not consider questions of liability or causation.
11 September llth Victims Compensation Fund of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-42, tit. IV,
§§ 401-409, 115 Stat. 230, 237-41.
12 Id. § 405(c)(3)(B), 115 Stat. at 239-40.
13 See 1 KENNETH R. FEINBERO ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER FOR THE
SEPTEMBER l1TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001, at 1 (2004).
14 Id.
15 See Opinion Supporting Order to Sever Issues of Damages and Liability in Selected
Cases, and to Schedule Trial of Issues of Damages at 3, In re September llth Litigation, No. 21
MC 97 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. July 5, 2007), available at http://wwwl.nysd.uscourts.gov/docs/rulings/
21MC97_opinion_070507.pdf.
16 Id. at 2.
17 Id. at 1.
18 Id. at 3-4.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 4.
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The results were intended to be available to other plaintiffs and to
defendants to assist them in valuing cases for settlement.21 As a result
of the decision to conduct bellwether trials using reverse bifurcation,
fourteen of the cases have settled so far.22
This is how the bellwether trial is used today. Cases are chosen,
not quite randomly, for trial on a particular issue.23 The results of the
trials are not binding on the other litigants in the group.24 The out-
comes can be used by the parties to assist in settlement, but the parties
can also ignore these results and insist on an individual trial. 25 There
was a time, however, when courts experimented with binding bell-
wether trials. Those experiments were prematurely ended, perhaps
due to the influence of a Fifth Circuit decision holding bellwether tri-
als unconstitutional on Seventh Amendment grounds.26
In a binding bellwether trial procedure, the court will choose a
random sample of cases to try to a jury.27 The judge may then bifur-
cate the cases into liability and damages phases, or perhaps even tri-
furcate them into liability, causation, and damages phases. 28 The
parties will try each bellwether case before a jury that will render a
verdict in that case.29 Finally, the results of the bellwether trials will
be extrapolated to the remaining plaintiffs.30 The underlying principle
of such an extrapolation is that the bellwether plaintiffs are typical of
the rest of the plaintiff group such that the results of the bellwether
trials represent the likely outcome of their cases as well. 31 What these
extrapolation plaintiffs get in a bellwether trial procedure is not indi-
viduated justice but rather group typical justice.
The following example explains how the extrapolation process
might work. Imagine that a court tries 100 sample cases and 50% of
21 Id.
22 See Order, In re September l1th Litigation, No. 21 MC 97 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17,
2007), available at http://wwwl.nysd.uscourts.gov/docs/rulings/21MC97_order_091707.pdf (or-
dering fourteen cases closed due to settlement).
23 Richard 0. Faulk, Robert E. Meadows & Kevin L. Colbert, Building a Better Mouse-
trap? A New Approach to Trying Mass Tort Cases, 29 TEX. TECH L. REV. 779, 791-92 (1998).
24 See In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1016, 1019 (5th Cir. 1997).
25 Id.
26 Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 320-21 (5th Cir. 1998).
27 See, e.g., In re Chevron, 109 F.3d at 1019.
28 See, e.g., Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 653 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (trifur-
cating asbestos case into three phases: failure-to-warn, causation, and damages), rev'd, 151 F.3d
297 (5th Cir. 1998).
29 See, e.g., In re Chevron, 109 F.3d at 1019.
30 Faulk, Meadows & Colbert, supra note 23, at 793.
31 Id.
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them result in plaintiff victories. Of these 50, half are awarded $200
and the other half are awarded $300. Taking all of these results into
account, and counting the defense verdicts as $0, the average award
would be $125. Under a simple averaging regime, every plaintiff
would receive $125. If this result seems too rough, the court could
calculate separate averages based on relevant variables.
The following examples illuminate both the mechanics of binding
bellwether trials and their potential as a solution for courts dealing
with mass tort cases.
A. Trying Thousands of Asbestos Cases
Asbestos is the paradigmatic story of modern mass tort litigation.
Although there are some unique features to the asbestos litigation, it
raised for the first time many of the recurring issues in mass tort litiga-
tion. This story has been told at length elsewhere, but it is worth
briefly reviewing to understand why a judge might think binding bell-
wether trials are the best solution to the seemingly intractable
problems posed by mass torts.32
Although it is a useful product, asbestos is also extremely harm-
ful. Manufacturers were aware of the risks of asbestos exposure by
the 1940s, but they did not warn employees or provide adequate pro-
tection for them.33 As a result, millions of workers were exposed to
asbestos and suffered injuries such as mesothelioma (a deadly cancer),
other cancers, asbestosis, and pleural abnormalities. 34 A 2004 study
estimated that nearly 730,000 people filed asbestos-related personal
injury lawsuits, many for nonmalignant injuries.35 The courts are over-
whelmed by the asbestos docket and have experimented with various
types of innovative procedures to deal with this influx of cases.36 Ef-
forts at global settlements failed due to the limitations on settlement
32 For a thorough review of the development of asbestos litigation, see STEPHEN J. CAR-
ROLL ET AL., RAND, ASBESTOS LITIGATION xvii-xxviii (2005). For an accessible, shorter analy-
sis, see Deborah Hensler, Asbestos Litigation in the United States: Triumph and Failure of the
Civil Justice System, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 255 (2006).
33 CARROLL, supra note 32, at xviii-xix.
34 Id.
35 Id. at xxiv.
36 Id. at xxi-xxiii.
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imposed by the Supreme Court. 37 Despite repeated pleas from judges,
legislative intervention has not been forthcoming.38
In 1990, Judge Robert Parker, then a federal district court judge
for the Eastern District of Texas, had approximately 3000 wrongful
death suits arising out of asbestos exposure before him.39 The court
could not have tried all these suits in a reasonable time frame, so he
adopted an innovative procedure: binding bellwether trials. He ap-
proved a trial plan that was to proceed in three phases. The first
phase provided class-wide determinations of failure to warn and puni-
tive damages.40 The second phase determined causation. 41 The court
intended to have a jury establish asbestos exposure on a craft and
worksite basis during the relevant time periods, rather than on the
basis of individual proof.42 Instead, this phase was resolved by stipula-
tion, with defendants reserving their right to appeal.43 The third
phase, which is the one that concerns us here, was the damages
phase.44
Judge Parker selected 160 cases to be tried before two jury
panels.45 Each jury was told that the causation requirement had been
met and was charged only with determining damages in each individ-
ual case before it.46 The trials took 133 days, involving hundreds of
witnesses and thousands of exhibits. 47 The effort expended in the pro-
ceeding was enormous, and Judge Parker noted, "If all that is accom-
plished by this is the closing of 169 cases then it was not worth the
effort and will not be repeated. '48
37 See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 864-65 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620-29 (1997). For a trenchant critique of attempts to settle asbestos
cases globally, see Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem
Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045 (1995).
38 "The argument is sensibly made that a nationwide administrative claims processing re-
gime would provide the most secure, fair, and efficient means of compensating victims of asbes-
tos exposure. Congress, however, has not adopted such a solution." Amchem, 521 U.S. at
628-29.
39 See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 653 (E.D. Tex. 1990), rev'd, 151
F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998).
40 Id. at 653.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 307-08 (5th Cir. 1998).
44 Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 653.
45 Id. at 664.
46 See id. at 653-54.
47 Id. at 653.
48 Id.
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Of the 160 bellwether verdicts, the court remitted 35 and 12 were
awarded no damages.49 The court allocated the cases into five disease
categories and averaged the awards, including the zero awards, within
those categories.50 The average verdict in each disease category was
"mesothelioma, $1,224,333; lung cancer, $545,200; other cancer,
$917,785; asbestosis, $543,783; pleural disease, $558,900."51 After
hearing expert testimony, the judge determined that these cases were
typical or representative of the remaining plaintiffs.52 The judge held
a hearing in which he assigned the remaining cases to one of the five
disease categories. 53 He made an award in each case according to the
average award for that disease category. 54 Thus, for example, each
plaintiff with mesothelioma was awarded $1,224,333-even those
whose cases had not actually been tried.
The plaintiffs agreed to this procedure, likely because the alterna-
tive was an untenably long wait for a trial. The defendants, by con-
trast, objected and appealed.55 They argued that under Texas law and
the Seventh Amendment they were entitled to an individual trial on
causation and damages for each plaintiff.56 The Fifth Circuit, perhaps
hoping for legislative intervention, waited eight years before reversing
the district court's trial plan.57 The circuit court rejected the bell-
wether trial procedure, reasoning that the Seventh Amendment and
Texas law entitled the defendants to individual trials against each
plaintiff on both causation and damages. 58 The cases were remanded
to Judge Parker.59
Judge Parker's experience encapsulates the political economy of
mass tort adjudication. Most of these cases arise out of some type of
regulatory failure, come to the courts in masses that are beyond the
capabilities of the courts to adequately adjudicate one by one, and
49 Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 300 n.3 (5th Cir. 1998).
50 Id. at 304.
51 Id. at 297, 305.
52 Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 664 ("The Court is of the opinion that the distribution of vari-
ables between the samples and their respective subclasses is comparable."). Because the court
relied on the plaintiffs' expert, who analyzed information provided by the plaintiffs only, this
conclusion was suspect.
53 Cimino, 151 F.3d at 300, 305, 309. The court only entered judgment in five extrapola-
tion cases. See id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 300.
56 Id. at 300-01.
57 Id. at 297, rev'g Cimino, 751 F. Supp. 649.
58 Id. at 311.
59 Id. at 321.
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there is little hope of a legislative solution. The congressional re-
sponse to the terrorist attacks of September l1th is a notable excep-
tion to this rule. To put it more directly: the courts are stuck with
mass tort cases, and these cases continue to multiply. For these rea-
sons, bellwether trials are a promising alternative for promoting
justice.
B. Adjudicating Human Rights Abuses
Mass torts can take many forms. Consider, for example, the class
action litigation against the estate of Philippine dictator Ferdinand
Marcos. 60 Marcos declared martial law in the Philippines on Septem-
ber 21, 1972.61 Shortly thereafter, he ordered ratification of a constitu-
tion revised to keep him in power. 62 He issued several orders
maintaining his power, including General Orders 2 and 2A, which au-
thorized the arrest of dissidents. 63 Anyone who was either an oppo-
nent of the Marcos regime or perceived as one could be arrested and
detained.64 Persons arrested by the government on suspicion of oppo-
sition were tortured in a variety of ways. Some of the more disturbing
practices included submerging the heads of prisoners in toilet bowls
full of excrement, the placement of a cloth over the mouth and nose of
a prisoner and pouring water over it to produce a drowning sensation,
near suffocation of prisoners by placing a plastic bag over their heads,
electric shocks to the genitals, rape and sexual molestation, and long
terms of solitary confinement while tied with chains or rope. 65 Some
prisoners "disappeared" and were presumed killed, some were sum-
marily executed, others survived. 66
Marcos ruled the Philippines as a dictator from 1972 until 1986,
during which period the practices described above occurred. 67 In 1986
he fled to Hawaii with his family and loyal supporters. Lawsuits were
filed against him, and subsequently his estate, in Hawaii under the
Alien Tort Claims Act 68 and the Torture Victim Protection Act of
60 The history provided here is taken from the district court opinion in In re Estate of
Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 910 F. Supp. 1460 (D. Haw. 1995), affd sub nom. Hilao v.
Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996).
61 Id. at 1463.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 1462-63.
66 Id. at 1462.
67 Id. at 1461.
68 Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
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1991 ("TVPA"). 69 One such lawsuit was a class action known as In re
Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation.70
The class action lawsuit against the Marcos estate proceeded in
three phases: a liability phase, a punitive damages phase, and a com-
pensatory damages phase. In the liability phase, the jury found de-
fendants liable to 10,059 plaintiffs for torture, summary execution, and
disappearance. 71 This was followed by a punitive damages phase, in
which the jury awarded the plaintiffs $1.2 billion.72 Finally, the court
oversaw a compensatory damages phase. This last phase is the most
interesting from a procedural perspective.
First, the court established an opt-in class.73 After the court inval-
idated some claims, a total of 9541 claims remained. Of these, the
district court randomly selected 137 sample cases.74 A special master
traveled to the Philippines, where he conducted depositions and re-
viewed documents. 75 Utilizing this information, he made preliminary
validity and damages findings with regard to each of the plaintiffs in
the sample group.76 He recommended that 6 of the 137 claims be
found invalid.77 His damages recommendation in each case utilized
the following factors:
(1) whether the abuse claimed came within one of the defini-
tions, with which the Court charged the jury at the trial...,
of torture, summary execution, or disappearance; (2)
whether the Philippine military or paramilitary was ... in-
volved in such abuse; and (3) whether the abuse occurred
during the period September 1972 through February 1986.78
He recommended a 5% invalidity rate because he found 6 of the
137 sample claims (4.37%) invalid.79 The average recommended
69 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2000).
70 In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. 1460 (D. Haw. 1995), affd sub
nom. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996).
71 Id. at 1463-64.
72 Id. at 1464.
73 Contra Kern v. Siemens, 393 F.3d 120, 128 (2d Cir. 2004) (invalidating opt-in damages
classes).
74 The number of sample cases was chosen based on expert testimony that a sample size of
137 would result in "a 95 percent statistical probability that the same percentage determined to
be valid among the examined claims would be applicable to the totality of claims filed." Hilao v.
Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 782 (9th Cir. 1996). The margin of error used was five percent,
that being prevalent in the social sciences. Id. at 783.
75 Id. at 782.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 783.
78 Id. at 782.
79 Id. at 783.
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award for the 64 torture claims was $51,719; the average of the 50
summary execution claims was $128,515; and the average of the 17
disappearance claims was $107,853.80 The special master further rec-
ommended that the total award to the class be determined by multi-
plying the number of valid claims in each subclass by the average
award for claimants in that subclass and adding to this number the
awards for the sample claimants.81 These recommendations were then
presented to the jury along with expert testimony that the methodol-
ogy used by the special master was statistically sound.82 The jury de-
liberated for five days and reached conclusions close to, but different
from, the recommendations of the special master on the individual
sample claims, indicating that the jury had independently evaluated
the evidence. 83 The jury accepted the special master's recommenda-
tions with respect to the extrapolation claims without changes.84 The
jury's differences from the special master included both increased
awards on some claims and decreased awards in others.85 The Ninth
Circuit upheld this procedure, finding that it did not violate defend-
ants' right to due process of law. 86
The Marcos human rights litigation benefited from some unique
circumstances for a mass tort. Choice of law was not an issue. The
TVPA does not specify how damages are to be determined, and so the
courts have developed federal common law to address damages issues
in such cases.87 In a domestic mass tort case, by contrast, differing
state laws present a barrier to certification of a class action. 88 In this
regard, the case was easier to certify as a class action and therefore
80 Id.
81 Id. The total compensatory award recommended by the special master was
$767,491,493. Id.
82 Id. at 784.
83 Id. The same jury that had made the determination on liability and punitive damages
was then reconvened to evaluate the testimony gathered by the special master and his recom-
mendations, and to award damages. Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 784 n.9. One aspect of the extrapolation that raises due process concerns is that
the jury found that only two (rather than four) of the sample claims were invalid. Id. at 784 n.10.
Nevertheless, the jury awarded the extrapolation amount based on a five percent invalidity rate
as recommended by the special master. Id. The invalidity rate should probably have been re-
duced to reflect the jury's findings.
86 Id. at 767-68.
87 In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. 1460, 1469 (D. Haw. 1995),
affd sub nom. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996).
88 See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1293-94 (7th Cir. 1995) (revers-
ing class action certification in mass tort case because class members were subject to multiple
and conflicting state laws).
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more amenable to group typical justice. Nevertheless, individuation
still stood as a potential objection to class treatment. Each plaintiff
surely had his or her own unique and harrowing story of torture or
murder and its consequences. The fact that the court upheld statistical
adjudication in this case illustrates the possibility of achieving group
typical justice.
The procedure used in this human rights litigation allowed the
initial damages determinations to be made by an expert and thereafter
evaluated and ratified by a jury.8 9 This shows that the jury can be
involved in multiple phases of the process. The jury can determine
damages in individual cases and can also review suggested extrapola-
tion options and thereby lend legitimacy to the extrapolation process.
Nobody in the Marcos litigation received an individual jury trial, but
the group of plaintiffs did. The litigation achieved several objectives:
compensation, publicity, and a process that included a jury evaluation
of the wrongs committed. In the absence of the procedure utilized by
the court, it is almost certain that the plaintiffs in this case would
never have received a day in court.
Group typicality, as these examples illustrate, is not perfect jus-
tice. Most of the individual plaintiffs cannot participate directly. The
definition of the group may be inaccurate, such as by including per-
sons with significantly different characteristics. It is furthermore cer-
tain that the average award this procedure provides to extrapolation
plaintiffs will differ from what they would have received in an individ-
ual jury trial. The averaging process redistributes money from the
highest-value claims to the lower-value claims, even within a group of
similarly situated individuals. 90 But bellwether trials are a far more
palatable method for resolving mass litigation than the alternatives:
standing on the sidelines waiting to be heard or settling en mass. As
Judge Weinstein observed in a recent opinion,
[i]n mass fraud cases with hundreds of thousands or millions
of injured the cost of one-on-one procedures is insuperable
and unsuitable for either a jury or a bench trial. The conse-
quence of requiring individual proof from each smoker
would be to allow a defendant which has injured millions of
people and caused billions of dollars in damages to escape
almost all liability.91
89 Contra In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1990) (rejecting similar "lump
sum" procedure on due process and state law grounds).
90 Bone, supra note 2, at 599-600.
91 Schwab v. Philip Morris U.S.A., Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 992 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (certifying
[Vol 76:576
Bellwether Trials
Despite the significant problems group typical justice poses, bell-
wether trials are a good second-best solution to this difficult problem.
IL The Policy Arguments for Bellwether Trials
The primary purpose of procedure is to realize the substantive
aims of the law. 92 But procedure and substance have a reciprocal rela-
tionship. Procedures not only realize the aims of the substantive law,
they also influence its direction. Furthermore, some procedures, such
as the jury trial, also have an intrinsic value.93 The bellwether trial
procedure realizes both the aims of the jury right and the aims of sub-
stantive tort law. Bellwether trials also affect the aims of the substan-
tive tort law in mass cases by making group typical justice possible.
A. The Jury Right
Two policy goals underpin the right to a jury trial: citizen partici-
pation and prevention of systemic bias. The jury trial introduces dem-
ocratic values into the court system by involving citizens in judicial
decisionmaking. Such citizen participation is an independent civic
good. The jury trial also helps avoid the systemic bias that might de-
velop if all cases were decided by professional judges. These two ar-
guments are interrelated because the introduction of democratic
decisionmakers avoids the bias of an entrenched judicial elite. Bell-
wether trial procedures realize both of these policy aims.
The debates around the right to a jury in the American colonies,
and leading up to the ratification of the original Constitution and the
Bill of Rights, illuminate the reasons for the strong American adher-
ence to the jury right.94 This is not to say that there are not other
historical and contemporary sources to support the policies behind the
RICO class action on behalf of smokers of light cigarettes and holding that use of statistical
evidence to establish liability and damages did not violate defendants' due process rights).
92 This is what John Rawls called "perfect procedural justice," which presents an indepen-
dent criterion for fairness and a procedure that provides that outcome. JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY
OF JusTICE 85 (1971).
93 The intrinsic value of procedure can be alternatively stated as "pure procedural justice,"
wherein whatever result is reached by the procedure is understood to be fair so long as the
procedure is correctly followed. Id. at 86. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356
U.S. 525, 537-39 (1958) (describing the trial by jury in civil cases as an "essential characteristic"
of the federal system).
94 By comparison, the jury right has declined in other common-law jurisdictions. See gen-
erally WORLD JURY SYsTEMs (Neil Vidmar ed., 2000); Hein Kotz, Civil Justice Systems in Europe
and the United States, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 61, 73 (2005) (describing the decline of the
civil jury in England, Canada, and Australia). Although the jury right has been eroded in the
United States, it still remains relatively strong.
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jury right or that an originalist approach is the best method of estab-
lishing the principles animating the jury right.95 Nor do I provide an
exhaustive history here. The point is merely to revive the rationale
for the jury right articulated in and around 1789.96 The focus on early
American materials is based largely on the fact that these sources re-
main compelling and is in part responsive to the focus on originalism
embedded in Seventh Amendment doctrine. 97
Many American colonists saw the jury as an antidote to the op-
pressive rule of British governors. The jury was understood as an
egalitarian, democratic institution in contrast to equity courts, where
the royally appointed governor was the decisionmaker. Thus, some
colonists were more interested in the decisionmaker than the substan-
tive and procedural differences between equity and common-law
courts. Whereas in England equity courts were understood as an anti-
dote to the rigidity of the common law, colonists were more con-
cerned with the antidemocratic implications of royal control over
equity courts.98 Equity served as a reminder of the limits on civic par-
ticipation. "The very existence of chancery courts, with their long tra-
dition in English history, made it apparent that, in America, if the
conscience of the King was not the source of equity jurisdiction, then a
more popular legislative source must be identified." 99
95 My use of historical materials serves to inform the discussion about the function of the
jury, not to take a position with respect to the active and fascinating debate on the uses (and
misuses) of originalism in constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL
MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN TIE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996) (describing and
critiquing originalist jurisprudence); Jack Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemp-
tion, 24 CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming 2008) (articulating a theory of constitutional interpreta-
tion that relies on fidelity to the original meaning and its underlying principles); Reva Siegel &
Robert Post, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right's Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 545, 545-74 (2006) (critiquing originalism's pretensions).
96 This foray is probably best described as "lawyer's history." For a discussion of the his-
tory and politics of lawyer's or "law office" history, see LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CA-
REER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (1996). The use of historical materials in this manner is largely
unavoidable in this analysis, but the reader should be aware that this work does not purport to
provide a truly nuanced historical account. See Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit
Love Affair, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 119 (critiquing the Supreme Court's use of history in constitu-
tional cases).
97 The test for determining whether the jury right attaches is referred to as the "historical
test" and is based on the distinction between causes of action at law (where a jury was available)
and in equity (where a jury was not available) as they were understood in 1791. The origin of
this test is Justice Story's circuit opinion in United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750). This approach is analyzed and critiqued in Part III.C, infra.
98 Stanley N. Katz, The Politics of Law in Colonial America: Controversies over Chancery
Courts and Equity Law in the Eighteenth Century, in 5 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY
257, 272 (Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds., 1971).
99 Id. at 283. At the same time, Katz points out that the approach to the politics of law and
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The jury injected the popular will into the court system. As
Thomas Jefferson explained in 1789:
We think in America it is necessary to introduce the people
into every department of government as far as they are capa-
ble of exercising it . . . Were I called upon to decide
whether the people had best be omitted from the Legislative
or Judiciary department, I would say it is better to leave
them out of the Legislative. The execution of the laws is
more important than the making them.10°
The argument that the jury right serves as a bulwark against sys-
temic judicial corruption received support across political lines. For
example, the Antifederalists opposed ratification of the original Con-
stitution in part because Article III contained no right to a trial by jury
in civil cases. They worried that debtors, as a group, would be treated
unfairly by distant federal judges.10 1 Antifederalists argued, "We
know that the trial by a jury of the vicinage is one of the greatest
securities for property. If causes are to be decided at such a great
distance, the poor will be oppressed .... "102 Thomas Jefferson ex-
pressed the same view more radically; "But we all know that perma-
nent judges acquire an Esprit de corps" and may be tempted by
bribery and misled "by a spirit of party, a devotion to the Executive or
the Legislative," and "[i]t is left therefore to the juries, if they think
the permanent judges are under any biass [sic] whatever in any cause,
to take upon themselves to judge the law as well as the fact. ' 10 3 Fed-
eralists seem to have agreed on this point, as Alexander Hamilton
wrote in The Federalist No. 83, "The strongest argument in its favour
is that it is a security against corruption."10 4 When introducing the bill
to Congress that ultimately became the Bill of Rights, James Madison
described the jury right variously as "that great bulwark of personal
chancery was inconsistent during the colonial era. Even vociferous opponents of chancery
courts sometimes served as chancellors. Id. at 284.
100 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abbe Arnoux (July 19, 1789), in 5 THE FOUNDERS'
CoNsTrrTrrIoN 364 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). The political impetus for this
statement may have had to do with Jefferson's relationship with Chief Justice John Marshall. On
their difficult relationship from Marshall's perspective, see R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MAR-
SHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE SUPREME COURT (2001).
101 See Matthew P. Harrington, The Economic Origins of the Seventh Amendment, 87 IOWA
L. REv. 145, 169-76 (2002) (describing the role of debt in the establishment of the jury right).
102 Debates of the North Carolina Constitutional Convention, reprinted in THE COMPLETE
BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES AND ORIGINS 523 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997).
103 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abbe Arnoux, supra note 100, at 364.
104 THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDER'S CONSTI-
TUTION, supra note 100, at 360.
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safety," "one of the great securities of the rights of the people," and "a
right resulting from the social compact which regulates the action of
the community. 10 5 Individual jurors may be biased, as human beings
sometimes are, but they will never introduce systemic bias to the
courts. This is because a different jury sits in every case and the deci-
sion rests in the hands of twelve rather than one person.
Bellwether trials promote both the aims of democratic decision-
making and protection against systemic bias. The only way to under-
stand how bellwether trials can promote these goals is to evaluate
them within the context of the political economy of modern mass liti-
gation. When trials are not available to litigants for structural reasons,
it is arguable that these litigants have no right to a trial by jury in a
meaningful sense. Because individual jury trials are not a genuine
possibility, modern mass litigation is both antidemocratic and prone to
bias in decisionmaking. Bellwether trials ameliorate these problems.
In mass tort cases, the number of plaintiffs is enormous. The
most extreme example is asbestos litigation: 106,069 cases were con-
solidated in multidistrict litigation in the federal courts alone. 10 6 The
court system lacks the resources to provide an individual trial for each
asbestos plaintiff. Instead, individual suits languish or are aggregated,
consolidated, or, in the most unlikely case, certified as a class action.10 7
If the litigation is settled, either as a settlement class action or through
more informal aggregative settlements, the settlement will not provide
individually determined compensation. 10 8 A-plaintiff will be made an
offer based on how his injuries fit into a matrix established for the
purpose of determining damages, or he will be offered a set amount
regardless of his individual circumstances. In the absence of mass set-
tlement, the economics of litigation are such that only individuals with
the most valuable cases are likely to receive an adjudicated result, and
even they will wait for it. Those with less valuable cases are likely to
105 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 454 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
106 Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 491 (2004).
107 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000) (providing for transfer of pretrial proceedings to one
federal district court); FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (class actions); FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a) (consolidation).
Because class certification of mass tort cases is extraordinarily difficult, these cases often result
in either a settlement-only class action or aggregative settlement. See Elizabeth Cabraser, The
Manageable Nationwide Class Action: A Choice of Law Legacy of Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts,
74 UMKC L. REV. 543, 545 (2006) (observing that most state court grants of class certification
are for settlement purposes).
108 See Howard M. Erichson, A Typology of Aggregate Settlements, 80 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1769 (2005) (describing types of collective settlements to resolve nonclass multiparty
litigation).
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be excluded from the court system altogether, because bringing a case
to trial is too time consuming and expensive. As a consequence, many
mass tort victims face a choice between joining a mass settlement or
nothing.1°9 Thus, settlement is currently the only realistic option for
collective resolution of mass claims, and it is of limited utility.110
The significance of the reliance on settlement to resolve mass tort
litigation is twofold. First, individual litigants will not have the lever-
age that a realistic threat of trial provides."' Second, juries do not
determine damages in settled cases and individual plaintiffs are not
ordinarily involved in negotiations. Instead, lawyers (in some cases
with judicial oversight) determine damages awards privately. 12 As a
result, the current regime violates both of the principles that animate
the right to a jury trial. Settlement is undemocratic because lawyers
reach settlement privately with limited judicial or client oversight. It
also risks corruption or bias because these decisionmakers may have
systemic interests at odds with those of the individual plaintiffs. For
example, judges have the interest of reducing their dockets and may
become inured to the plight of plaintiffs. Lawyers may have their own
interests that are at odds with their clients' and they may be tempted
to trade some clients off against others to resolve large numbers of
cases collectively." 3 When a trial is not available to litigants for struc-
tural or practical reasons, as is currently the case, then it is difficult to
argue that these litigants have a right to a trial by jury in any meaning-
ful sense.
109 The recent aggregate settlement of cases against Vioxx, which requires the plaintiffs'
lawyers to recommend the settlement to all of their clients and withdraw from cases not so
settled, provides a good example of this stark choice. See Settlement Agreement Between Merck
& Co., Inc. and the Counsel Listed on the Signature Pages Hereto, para. 1.2.8.1, 1.2.8.2 (Nov. 9.
2007) (on file with author).
110 Settlement is of limited social utility both because not all cases can be settled, see
Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (overturning asbestos settlement on the
grounds that the class certification did not comport with the underlying requirements of Rule
23), and because settlements are not always beneficial.
111 See Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social
Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575, 607 (1997) (stating that the social utility
of trials is "to provide victims with the threat necessary to induce settlement").
112 See Deborah R. Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Realities of Class Ac-
tion and Other Large Scale Litigation, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 179, 189 (2001) (describing
the dearth of individual plaintiff involvement and the quasi-administrative character of aggrega-
tive settlement).
113 See Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 469,
521-23 (1994) (discussing the considerable ethical problems that the allocation of funds in settle-
ment raises for plaintiffs' attorneys).
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Bellwether trials, by contrast, promote democratic decisionmak-
ing by providing a procedure for citizens to be involved in the process
of determining the outcome of mass tort cases instead of abdicating
this role to lawyers with minimal judicial oversight. The inclusion of
democratic decisionmaking is especially important in mass tort cases.
Because of their scale, mass tort cases require the courts to adopt a
regulatory function, which has usually involved jettisoning the jury
trial.114 Involving the jury legitimizes court resolution of mass tort
cases because it inserts an element of democratic participation.
Furthermore, bellwether trials avoid the dangers of systemic cor-
ruption that plague mass settlements: the jury members have no finan-
cial interest in the outcome of the litigation and the determination of
damages. They do not expect to hear multiple cases over a period of
years. They will not grow weary of the cases. And they have no in-
centive to clear the docket. The jury members may be interested in
having the trial completed more quickly in order to go back to their
daily lives, but they do not stand to lose or gain anything based on the
outcome of the litigation.115
There are limits, however, to the ability of the bellwether trial to
realize the principles of the jury right. Bellwether trials are central-
ized rather than decentralized. If only one jury hears a number of
trials and makes decisions that are to be extrapolated to a larger pop-
ulation, then one set of jurors, rather than many sets over many years,
will decide the fate of thousands of cases. 116 Centralization means that
there is a greater possibility for systemic bias to enter into the process
than with the baseline of ordinary individual trials. There are cures
for centralization, 117 but not for the passage of time required to
achieve the truly decentralized "maturation" of a mass tort.
114 This has often been remarked in the literature on mass torts. See, e.g., RICHARD A.
NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETrLEMENT (2007) (describing the use of administra-
tive techniques in mass tort cases and proposing an administrative solution).
115 See GuIDo CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBIT, TRAic CHOICES 57-78 (1978) (arguing that
juries are well situated to make "tragic choices" free from political backlash or prejudice because
they are one-time players).
116 This decentralization is central to the theory of the "mature mass tort." See Francis E.
McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659, 688-94 (1989). This
theory has been adopted by prominent judges. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rohrer, Inc., 51
F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.).
117 For example, multiple juries could be used instead of having a single jury determine
each bellwether case. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rohrer, 51 F.3d at 1300 (suggesting, as an alter-
native to centralization of mature mass torts, "submitting an issue to multiple juries constituting
in the aggregate a much larger and more diverse sample of decision-makers").
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The criticisms directed at the individual jury trial also apply to
bellwether trials. These are too voluminous to describe in detail here,
but two criticisms must be briefly addressed.11 8 Critics of the jury trial
have been concerned that juries cannot understand complex scientific
evidence. 119 Scholars have also demonstrated that cognitive biases can
affect jury decisionmaking. 120
The criticisms should be weighed against the values the jury right
was meant to support. The expertise and good sense of judges, even if
superior to that of many jurors, is not so infallible that it is worth
undermining the democracy-promoting values of the jury trial.
Human fallibility is not the exclusive province of the jury. Even with
substantial scientific expertise, judges may have their own biases and
their own interests, such as in minimizing litigation management. 121
Furthermore, studies show that on the whole juries and judges agree
as to the outcomes of most cases.122 The jury provides a "fair and
equitable" decision in a given case not necessarily because the jury's
determination is more likely to be objectively correct, but because the
jury is part of a legitimate decisionmaking process. 123 The acceptance
of criticisms based on juror limitations may one day dislodge the jury
from the role of legitimate decisionmaker, but it has yet to do so.
Jury decisionmaking lends greater legitimacy to nonobjective,
controversial decisions such as the monetization of harm because it
embodies the values of democratic participation and deliberation.
Jury verdicts are understood to reflect the norms and morals of the
community and this lends legitimacy to the procedure and the out-
come.124 Legitimacy is an even greater concern when lawyers, not
118 For an overview of the criticisms, see VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE
JURY 97-164 (1986).
119 Id. at 113-30.
120 See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain
and Suffering Awards, 81 VA. L. REV. 1341 (1995).
121 See, e.g., John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 533,
539-40 (2007) (discussing the incentive for judges in class action lawsuits to avoid trial); Chris
Guthrie, Misjudging, 7 NEV. L.J. 420, 421 (2007) ("Judges possess three sets of blinders: informa-
tional, cognitive, and attitudinal. These blinders .. .can be understood as obstacles to clear
judgment and perception.").
122 See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 118, at 117 (citing study that judges and juries agreed
on outcome 78% of the time, and that the remaining 22% of the time their disagreement was
balanced between plaintiffs and defendants).
123 See Martin Redish, Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial: Implications of the Liti-
gation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1331 (2005). The jury is made legitimate both by long
usage and by its democratic and independent qualities. It remains the primary politically legiti-
mate means for ascertaining value within our legal system.
124 See Solum, supra note 2, at 183 (stating that "a process that guarantees rights of mean-
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judges, make decisions through settlement.1 25 By providing a viable
procedure for publicly trying mass tort claims, binding bellwether tri-
als at a minimum provide the leverage necessary to encourage good
settlements. If successful, bellwether trials offer a procedure more
likely to legitimate group typical justice than the alternative of private
negotiation, because they rely on citizen participation and delibera-
tion.
B. The Substantive Law
Procedures are created to realize the aims of the substantive
law-that is, to achieve rectitude. But the availability of procedures
can also alter the development of the substantive law. By providing a
procedure for realizing group typical justice, bellwether trials both
help realize the extant aims of tort law and move the substantive law
towards group typicality.
Collective resolution of mass tort cases requires acceptance of
probabilistic proof based on group typicality rather than individua-
tion. Some judges and scholars believe that group typicality is anti-
thetical to traditional tort law.126 This is true to the extent that
traditional common-law tort doctrines are based on theories of indi-
vidual responsibility, such as corrective justice, requiring particular-
ized proof of causation and damages. But there are substantial
examples of probabilistic thinking within substantive tort doctrines
that leave the door open for procedures such as bellwether trials. In-
novative procedures, in turn, make possible the development of sub-
stantive doctrines aimed at achieving group typical justice.
The theories of tort law that procedures aim to realize fall into
two general categories: individual responsibility and social insur-
ance.127 For example, corrective justice is a theory based on individual
ingful participation is an essential prerequisite for the legitimate authority of action-guiding legal
norms").
125 See Samueal Isaacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement:
An Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1571, 1621-25 (2004)
(describing the history of aggregate settlements constructed by lawyers).
126 See, e.g., In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 711-12 (5th Cir. 1990) (Higgenbotham,
J.) (stating that procedures such as bellwether trials violate the fundamental principles of tort
law).
127 There are many ways to categorize theories of tort law. The two general categories I
choose here encompass many of the dominant theories, which are too many to fully explore in
this brief Article. For a useful canvas of the dominant approaches to tort law in North America,
see generally John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513 (2003), and
G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY (2003). The two
classic works advocating deterrence theory of tort are GUIDO CALABRESi, THE COSTS OF Acci-
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responsibility; deterrence is a social insurance theory. An individual
responsibility theory requires that plaintiffs pay the cost of uncertainty
unless they can show proof that this particular defendant acted wrong-
fully and caused them this particular harm. It is therefore character-
ized by a requirement of particularized proof of specific causation. As
a result, an individual responsibility paradigm for torts does not per-
mit collective resolution of mass tort cases.
A social insurance theory of tort law, by contrast, allocates at
least some of the cost of uncertainty regarding responsibility to the
defendant who might be culpable or who is verifiably culpable even
though the extent of the damage is difficult to determine. It permits
and encourages collective resolution of mass torts. Bellwether trials
realize the aims of the social insurance theory of tort law. More than
this, bellwether trials are both made necessary by the social insurance
function of tort law and breathe life into it.
Bellwether trials rely on the idea that the findings of one set of
typical trials (the "bellwether" cases) can be extrapolated to many
other plaintiffs who did not participate and who have not presented
proof of causation and damages in their particular case. Because bell-
wether trials are based on group typicality, this procedure cannot al-
low the majority of plaintiffs to present particular evidence. For this
reason, bellwether trials are generally understood to be incompatible
with tort theories based on individual responsibility. One prominent
judge has explained:
Commonality among class members on issues of causation
and damages can be achieved only by lifting the description
of the claims to a level of generality that tears them from
their substantively required moorings to actual causation and
discrete injury. Procedures can be devised to implement
such generalizations, but not without alteration of substan-
tive principle.128
The substantive principle at stake in the case of the asbestos
plaintiff who is given an extrapolation verdict rather than an individu-
alized result is corrective justice, an individual responsibility theory of
DENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970), and WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987). For a more recent evaluation of
deterrence theory, see Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does
Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377 (1994) (describing criticisms of deterrence theory
and concluding, based on empirical data, that tort law can have a deterrent effect). For an analy-
sis of individual responsibility in tort law, see Anthony J. Sebok, The Fall and Rise of Blame in
American Tort Law, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1031 (2003).
128 In re iDbreboard, 893 F.2d at 712 (Higginbotham, J.).
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tort law. The reader who adheres to an individual responsibility the-
ory of tort and disagrees on a normative basis that social insurance
can ever be the animating principle of tort doctrine is unlikely to ac-
cept the validity of bellwether trials.129 But the foundations for a so-
cial insurance approach to tort have already been laid, making it a
plausible theoretical underpinning for tort doctrine and the imple-
mentation of bellwether procedures.
The operative theory of tort law will dictate the nature of accept-
able proof. The choice between probabilistic and particularized proof
consists of the allocation of the cost of uncertainty between plaintiffs
and defendants, which requires a normative decision. The following
familiar hypothetical illustrates the point.130 Assume that the blue bus
company owns eighty percent of the buses in a town. An accident is
caused by a bus, but the victim cannot identify which bus company
was responsible. There are three possible solutions to this case. First,
the court could hold that plaintiff should not be able to obtain com-
pensation because he cannot present any particularized proof that a
blue bus caused the accident. Under this approach, the defendant
cannot be held liable unless it is shown to be individually responsible,
and therefore the cost of uncertainty is placed squarely on the plain-
tiff. Second, a court could hold that because it is more probable than
not that the blue bus company caused the accident, it should be liable
for plaintiff's damages. This places the cost of uncertainty on the de-
fendant. It also has the negative effect of removing all incentives from
the bus company that owns the other twenty percent of the buses to
take reasonable care in driving. As long as there is no direct proof,
the minority bus company can cause accidents with impunity. Third,
the court could require the blue bus company to pay eighty percent of
the damages in the accident. In that case, the defendant bears the risk
of uncertainty to the limits of its share in the market. This solution
best embodies a social insurance theory of tort law.
Within particularistic proof lie the seeds of probabilistic reason-
ing. In every tort case there is some element of uncertainty which is
resolved by resort to probabilistic thinking. As David Rosenberg ex-
plains, "[a]ll knowledge of past as well as future events is probabilistic.
129 For a well-known example of scholarship critical of social insurance theories of tort, see
George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual
Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985).
130 See Laurence Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84
HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1341 n.37 (1971) (describing Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc., 58 N.E.2d 754
(Mass. 1945), the case on which this well-worn hypothetical is based).
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Inevitably it rests on intuitive or more rigorously acquired impressions
of the frequency with which similar events have occurred in like cir-
cumstances. 'Particularistic' evidence offers nothing more than a basis
for conclusions about a perceived balance of probabilities.' 1 31 Rosen-
berg provides the following useful example. 132 A lawsuit arises out of
a fall down a darkened stairwell and evidence can be presented that
the plaintiff's shoelaces were untied at the time of the fall. 133 That
evidence increases the probability that the plaintiff's fall was self-in-
flicted, but the jury's decision would remain probabilistic because "in-
evitably there would remain a degree of uncertainty correlating with
the frequency of falls caused by poor lighting within the larger set of
cases.1 34 A finding that the fall was self-inflicted in this case requires
extrapolation from experience with shoelaces and stairwells and is not
the result of certain knowledge. The difference between the type of
probabilistic thinking already accepted and statistical adjudication is
that the latter formalizes the decisionmaking process through rigorous
techniques. 135
Common-law doctrines such as foreseeability recognize the ne-
cessity of probabilistic thinking. For example, if courts adopted a
foreseeability test under which falls are the foreseeable consequence
of poor lighting, evidence that a given stairwell was poorly lit would
be sufficient to create a presumption that all falls from that stairwell
were more likely than not caused by poor lighting. Such legal pre-
sumptions are a way of introducing statistical evidence by converting a
question of fact into a question of law. 136 Bellwether trials propose a
similar move but in a more direct and transparent manner that en-
ables jury participation in the decisionmaking process.
So far, I have argued that (1) all decisions by a preponderance of
the evidence, i.e., that one outcome is more likely than the other, are
based on probabilistic thinking; (2) these decisions require extrapola-
tion from experience with a larger set of cases; and (3) therefore in-
131 David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law"
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 851, 870 (1984).
132 Id. at 870 n.77.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Cf Tribe, supra note 130, at 1331 (questioning the usefulness of formal statistical tech-
niques in jury decisionmaking with particular reference to criminal cases because, among other
things, they are likely to mislead the jury).
136 See Morton Horwitz, The Doctrine of Objective Causation, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 365
(David Kairys ed., 1990) (discussing the introduction of probability into the doctrine of causation
in the early twentieth century through the doctrine of foreseeability).
20081
The George Washington Law Review
herent uncertainty remains in the traditional model. These conditions
are not sufficient to justify group typical justice. For example, in the
case of the poorly lit stairwell, an individual responsibility theory of
tort law would still permit the defendant to rebut the presumption
that falls are more likely than not caused by poor lighting by introduc-
ing particularistic evidence about an individual plaintiff's shoelaces.
This would limit the possibility of collective litigation. Nevertheless, a
first step to legitimizing group typicality is to acknowledge that well-
entrenched doctrines such as foreseeability recognize probabilistic
thinking and extrapolation from one experience to another.
To move a step further toward group typical justice, consider the
doctrine of market-share liability as a substantive analogue to bell-
wether trial procedures. 137 Under that rule, a defendant is liable for a
share of the damages caused by a defective product in proportion to
its share of the market for that product, even if the plaintiff cannot
prove that this particular manufacturer caused her particular harm.
Some believe that the market-share liability theory relaxes the re-
quirement of causation because it compensates plaintiffs only for tor-
tious exposure to risk.138 Others argue that market-share liability does
not compensate plaintiffs for exposure to risk alone because plaintiff
must still prove that the product caused her harm. The plaintiff can-
not prove which product caused her harm because the circumstances
surrounding defendants' conduct made it impossible to determine
which defendant's product caused her damages. 39 These scholars lay
the cost of uncertainty at defendants' door. The key insight here is
that somebody, either plaintiff or defendant, must bear the cost of
uncertainty. If plaintiff bears this cost, then she will never be entitled
to recover even though she has been harmed and even if in fact defen-
dant's product caused that harm. If defendants bear this cost, then
some defendants who did not cause this plaintiff's injury might have to
137 See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 937-38 (Cal. 1980) (upholding market-share
liability theory in diethylstilbesterol ("DES") cases).
138 See Mark A. Geistfeld, The Doctrinal Unity of Alternative Liability and Market-Share
Liability, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 447, 478 (2006) (presenting analysis critical of market-share liability
theory). Another useful discussion of market-share liability from a slightly different point of
view is Arthur Ripstein & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Corrective Justice in an Age of Mass Torts, in
PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 214 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001).
139 Geistfeld, supra note 138, at 478-79.
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pay her.140 In that case, holding all defendants liable is a type of col-
lective sanction aimed at deterrence.'14
Like market-share liability theory, bellwether trials are a method
for allocating uncertainty. Under market-share liability, uncertainty
as to whose product harmed plaintiff is allocated among defendants.
In a bellwether trial procedure, the uncertainty concerns the plaintiff's
harm as well as the defendant's liability. That uncertainty is distrib-
uted among the plaintiffs as a group.
Insurance theories of tort embodied in both substantive doc-
trines, such as market-share liability, and procedures, such as bell-
wether trials, are logical reactions to massive industrial torts, which,
because of their immense size, make particularized proof largely im-
possible. The move away from individual responsibility towards insur-
ance as the animating theory of tort law coincided with the
development of standardized, industrial harms to large numbers of in-
dividuals. Insurance-based theories such as market-share liability
make sense in cases where a number of manufacturers produced a
standardized product that is identical in composition and indistin-
guishable by brand. So too, insurance-based approaches to procedure
make sense in cases where masses of people are subjected to the same
type of harm by the same type of product.142
The social insurance approach to tort law embodies the following
substantive aims: (1) deterring defendants from manufacturing harm-
ful products and encouraging defendants to take safety precautions by
forcing defendants to internalize the full costs of their activities; (2)
publicizing harms caused by products and substances; (3) awarding
compensation for persons harmed by various products. Bellwether
trials realize these aims better than the existing procedural regime.
The dominant aim of the insurance approach to tort law is to de-
ter defendants from manufacturing harmful products by encouraging
defendants to take safety precautions and forcing defendants to inter-
140 See Thomas ex rel. Gramling v. Mallett, 701 N.W.2d 523, 565 (Wis. 2005) (upholding
similar risk-contribution theory of liability in lead paint cases, recognizing that some innocent
defendants may be required to pay damages and holding that this was an acceptable cost to
provide plaintiff with an adequate remedy at law). But see City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore
& Co., 226 S.W.3d 110, 115-17 (Mo. 2007) (rejecting lead paint action in which plaintiffs could
not identify particular defendants causing particular damage).
141 See Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 348 (2003) (arguing
that collective sanctions are justified where the group is in a better position to monitor wrongdo-
ers than the individual).
142 See Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Ideology of Enterprise Liability, 55 MD. L.
REV. 1190 (1996) (arguing that the basic shift in tort theory is from a moralistic ideal of "correc-
tive justice" to a policy-oriented ideal of "collective justice").
20081
The George Washington Law Review
nalize the full costs of their activities. 143 Bellwether trials perform this
function better than the current procedural regime. The amount ex-
tracted from the defendant pursuant to a bellwether trial procedure
will reflect the full cost of the defendant's activities to the plaintiff
population as a whole. This is because a bellwether trial procedure
conducted using reliable statistical methods will yield a result that is
an assessment of the overall damage over the entire population of
plaintiffs. It reflects what would occur if individual trials were held for
all plaintiffs and the results aggregated. Accordingly, the bellwether
trial procedure will force the defendant to internalize the full cost of
its activities. This will deter misconduct and encourage the adoption
of safety precautions because defendants will know that they will be
forced to internalize the damages they cause.
In the current regime, by contrast, the divergence between the
private and social motive to utilize the legal system will often result in
defendants externalizing at least some of the cost of injury. 44 Defend-
ants can use overloaded dockets and the doctrinal and practical im-
pediments to litigating lawsuits collectively to minimize their expo-
sure. Various procedural rules are available to delay the litigation of
cases and make litigation costly for plaintiffs. A credible threat to
litigate each case to the ground can frighten off some plaintiffs with
legitimate claims but insufficient resources. 145 Defendants can also
leverage the high costs of litigation and the delay of individual trials to
obtain lower settlements. The knowledge that actual litigation is a
near impossibility alters the balance of power between the parties. In
most cases, delay favors defendants who are better off postponing any
transfer of assets for as long as possible. There may, however, be
some cases in which delay can be leveraged by plaintiffs, such as when
the uncertainty of a litigation outcome affects a defendant's stock
price or in the case of the sale of the company.146 In any event, consid-
erations other than the merits of the suit are apt to play a larger role
in settlement the more remote the possibility of actual litigation
becomes.
143 See generally Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 853-54 (advocating a deterrence rationale for
mass tort cases).
144 See generally Shavell, supra note 111 (arguing that failure to internalize the full social
cost of litigation distorts choices within the legal system).
145 This was Merck's stated strategy in the Vioxx litigation. See Alex Berenson, Legal
Stance May Pay Off for Merck, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2006, at C1 ("Lawyers on both sides agree
that Merck's victories, and its stated strategy of trying every case rather than settling any, are
discouraging plaintiffs with weaker claims.").
146 Thanks to Robert Bone for this point.
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An insurance approach to tort law also aims to publicize harms
caused by products.1 47 This aim is achieved by bellwether trials just as
well as by individual trials. The centralization offered by a bellwether
trial procedure-the proximity in time of the trials to one another and
the large amounts of money at stake-are likely to make bellwether
trials a powerful tool for conveying information about a product
through litigation. Bellwether cases are likely both to be litigated by
skilled lawyers and to receive media attention. By contrast, the cur-
rent practices of aggregation and private settlement discourage the
dissemination of information about a product. The defendants' inter-
est in large-scale settlement is to put the matter to rest, avoiding pub-
licity and its attendant costs. Likewise, the plaintiffs' attorneys'
interests are to resolve cases on the aggregate and to expeditiously
obtain payment and recoup litigation costs. Although they may seek
to publicize defendants' wrongdoing as a matter of principle, doing so
will not assist them in achieving these interests and, in fact, their in-
centives run in the direction of discretion once settlement discussions
are underway.
Bellwether trials also provide compensation to individual plain-
tiffs, the third aim of an insurance-based theory of torts. Compensa-
tion in bellwether trials is based on a probabilistic approach to
individual desert. Participating individuals will get the typical award
rather than an award crafted specifically to their circumstances. This
approach is difficult for some to accept because the dominant para-
digm has been individualized jury trials and awards.148 But recall that
ordinary trials require juries to extrapolate based on experience and
utilize probabilistic thinking. The bellwether trial procedure is a more
radical and transparent application of a probability principle already
present in the substantive law. It does not impose a higher cost of
error on the parties than an individual jury trial. Instead, a bellwether
trial procedure merely distributes the risk of error differently.
147 See Scott Moss, Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis of Confidential Settle-
ments, 105 MICH. L. REV. 867, 907-08 (2007) (arguing that one of the purposes of tort litigation
is to publicize which products are harmful, to assist consumer choice).
148 See Anita Bernstein, Formed by Thalidomide: Mass Torts as a False Cure for Toxic Ex-
posure, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2153, 2163 (1997) (describing the claim that American law is individ-
ualistic as a "truism"). The paradigm of individual trials does not reflect the historical reality.
See generally Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 125 (presenting a historical critique of the claim that
tort law has traditionally been individualistic). See also Lawrence M. Friedman, The Day Before
Trials Vanished, 1 EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 689, 689 (2004) ("There never was a regime of full
trials.").
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What is radical about group typicality is not the use of probabilis-
tic thinking in determining outcomes or the absence of particularistic
proof as to each plaintiff, but rather the direct admission required by
such a procedure that there is no objectively verifiable accurate out-
come to an individual case that can be used as a baseline to which an
award can be compared. Even the award in an individual case may
not be the same if tried again before a different jury. The only point
of reference is other jury verdicts in similar cases, an analysis that also
requires a definition of the variables relevant to establishing that the
cases are in fact similar. The legal system admits this fact in a variety
of ways: by holding nonbinding bellwether trials, by remitting verdicts
that do not fall within a reasonable range of verdicts, and by allowing
substantive legal theories that allocate liability based on market share
rather than individual responsibility. 149 Binding bellwether trials are
another step in this direction.
The most powerful objections to the bellwether trial procedure
concern the goal of compensation. Bellwether trial procedures give
rise to objections on the basis of distributive justice because averaging
awards transfers wealth from plaintiffs with the most valuable claims
to those with less valuable claims. Furthermore, determining whether
bellwether trials are fair depends on the composition of the group
across which compensation is distributed, raising reference class
problems. Bellwether trials also limit the ability of some individuals
to participate in the process that determines their award, raising au-
tonomy, dignity, and constitutional concerns. These legitimate objec-
tions are addressed below.
III. Objections to Bellwether Trials
There are three categories of objections to a binding bellwether
trial procedure: objections concerning the makeup of the reference
class and the consequences of extrapolation for distributive justice,
objections based on autonomy values and their due process implica-
tions, and objections based on limits imposed by the jury right. This
Part will address each of these objections in turn and show that al-
though objections to mandatory bellwether trials deserve serious con-
sideration, they are not insurmountable.
149 Similarities might also be drawn to the doctrine of "lost chance" and res ipsa loquitor.
See ARIEL PORAT & ALEX STEIN, TORT LIABILITY UNDER UNCERTAINTY 57-100 (2001) (setting
forth a nuanced theory of liability for uncertainty).
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A. The Reference Class Problem and Distributive Justice
The central difficulty of bellwether trials is the reference class
problem.15° This problem is caused by heterogeneity within the group
of plaintiffs to whom bellwether verdicts are to be extrapolated. Be-
cause individuals are different, a method is needed to determine
which ones are sufficiently similar to justify extrapolating the results
of bellwether trials to them. The more heterogeneous the group, the
more serious the distributive justice problems. This is because people
with divergent characteristics will receive the same awards under a
bellwether trial procedure that uses averaging as a method of extrapo-
lation. The same issue arises in class actions with respect to the "com-
monality" and "predominance" analyses. 151 With respect to which
variables can it be said that common issues predominate in a class
action? If the variables chosen are the most general, more commonal-
ity will be found than if the variables are more specific such that fewer
claimants share them. At bottom, this is an epistemological question
about the limits of statistical analysis, that is, to what extent is it possi-
ble to generalize across individuals?
Like all statistical analysis, the quality of outcomes in a bell-
wether trial procedure will depend on the power of the explanatory
variables about which inferences are to be made. There are two criti-
cal issues with regard to determining relevant variables. The first is
the question of which variables are relevant. The second is the extent
to which relevant variables can be determined objectively in the extra-
polation population.
Bellwether trials first require a determination of the number of
variables to be considered in the extrapolation process. Accordingly,
courts will need to choose variables relevant to establishing typicality.
The variables chosen will determine whether a given bellwether plain-
tiff is part of the group such that the average of the bellwether trial
awards yields a result typical for that group. A greater number of
variables will increase the axes along which plaintiffs in a given group
are similar. At the same time, the more variables chosen, the more
difficult it will be to implement the bellwether trial plan and the more
likely that the economies of scale intended to be achieved by bell-
wether trials will be lost.
150 See Mark Colyvan et al., Is It a Crime to Belong to a Reference Class?, 9 J. POL. PHIL.
168, 172 (2001) (defiming the reference class problem).
151 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a), (b)(3).
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The inherent limits of statistical analysis are exacerbated by the
likelihood of manipulation. If there is no obvious and objective
means for determining the parameters of the group that will be sub-
ject to extrapolation, there arises a possibility for the designers of a
bellwether trial procedure to manipulate the parameters of the group
to appease factional interests. Alterations to group parameters driven
by such private interests are likely to be systematically undesirable.
Defendants wishing to derail the plan, believing that their settlement
leverage is better in the absence of a litigated alternative, will push for
more variables to be taken into account, resulting in balkanization of
the group and the diminishment of the possibility of group typicality.
Although the size of the groupings should not affect a defendant's
overall liability, it will affect the utility of pursuing a bellwether trial
procedure. Plaintiffs with higher-value claims will also want to de-
crease the size of the groups so that their high-value claims will not be
averaged with lower-value claims. By contrast, plaintiffs with low-
value claims will want to increase the size of the group and decrease
the number of variables considered so that they can increase the value
of their award by averaging lower awards with higher ones. 152 Plain-
tiffs' attorneys with large numbers of cases will likely want to increase
the size of the group and diminish the distinguishing variables to ob-
tain the benefits of the economy of scale achieved by the procedure.
Judicial incentives are difficult to predict. Judges may favor larger
groupings that reduce their docket more quickly. In the alternative,
judges may choose groupings too small to use the procedure advanta-
geously for reasons that have to do with the autonomy concerns ad-
dressed in the next Part.
The second critical issue for determining variables is subjectivity.
Subjective variables by definition require individualized inquiries that
defeat the benefits offered by extrapolation. Consider the example of
a strip-search class action.153 Assume that there are two variables that
correlate with compensation. One is whether or not the plaintiff ex-
perienced a previous strip search, which could be determined by
whether the individual had been incarcerated in a facility that rou-
tinely administered strip searches. This is an objectively verifiable va-
riable. The second variable is the emotional condition of the plaintiff.
For example, are they an "eggshell skull" plaintiff, more likely to be
severely affected by this strip search? That information can only be
152 See Bone, supra note 2, at 599 n.108.
153 See, e.g., Tardiff v. Knox County, 365 F.3d 1, 2, 7 (1st Cir. 2004) (upholding certification
of class action brought by arrestees strip searched prior to arraignment).
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determined by an assessment of this individual plaintiff's condition.
The extrapolation phase of a bellwether trial procedure would be able
to take into account the former consideration (previous strip searches)
but not the latter (preexisting emotional state). Assuming that the
sample chosen is random and sufficiently large, the cost of not taking
into account a victim's preexisting emotional state in averaging awards
falls largely on the eggshell skull plaintiffs. Because the plaintiffs will
receive an average of the eggshell skull award and the ordinary award,
eggshell skull plaintiffs will receive something less than the average
eggshell skull award and ordinary plaintiffs will receive something
more than the average award for their grouping. Defendants, how-
ever, will pay the same amount that they would have if individual tri-
als were aggregated. Because determining subjective variables
requires individualized fact-finding, subjectivity poses a significant
barrier to implementation of bellwether trial procedure.
Variable subjectivity provides further opportunities for manipula-
tion. Defendants who object to the procedure will argue that subjec-
tive variables must be taken into account. This will increase the costs
of the procedure and reduce the possibility of obtaining economies of
scale. Plaintiffs who believe they have higher-value claims will prefer
subjective variables to be taken into account because these plaintiffs
are likely to obtain larger awards through an individuated procedure.
Plaintiffs who believe they have lower-value claims, on the other
hand, will prefer not to take the subjective variables into account be-
cause the averaging process will result in a wealth transfer from the
higher-value claims to lower-value claims. As discussed above, plain-
tiffs' lawyers may prefer a larger undifferentiated group to increase
their own payout and limit their workload.
Let us return to the strip search example to evaluate how such
manipulations might play out. That hypothetical case identified only
two variables: previous incarceration in a facility that routinely strip
searches inmates and emotional condition prior to search. It would be
relatively simple to split the larger group of strip-searched plaintiffs
into two subgroups: the previously incarcerated and the remainder.
But because the determination of prior emotional state is subjective, it
would be impossible to determine this without individual hearings.
Accordingly, a defendant seeking to derail the process will argue that
it is essential to determine whether or not a plaintiff is a member of
the "eggshell skull" to have valid groupings. So, too, eggshell skull
plaintiffs will argue that they should be placed in a separate group,
regardless of the cost of making that determination. On the other
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hand, plaintiffs in the ordinary group will prefer a larger group that
includes both eggshell skull and ordinary plaintiffs because this will
raise their average award. The requirement that subjective variables
must be determined through individual hearings eliminates the advan-
tages that a bellwether trial procedure offers.
To complicate matters further, defendants can argue that addi-
tional variables are essential to a fair determination, either because
they think taking these variables into account may lower awards over-
all or merely to make the procedure so complicated that it is aban-
doned by the court. There are, of course, infinite variables that might
make a difference in a jury's award of damages in a given case: race,
gender, work history, previous life experience of the plaintiffs, etcet-
era. An argument can be made that each of these variables is critical
to a fair determination. Taken to the extreme, this could make the
groups too small to justify a bellwether trial procedure.
Thus we return to the basic question of the limits of typicality:
what variables are to be taken into account in the determination that a
plaintiff is typical of a larger group and how rough can the justice that
these variables dictate be? There is no uniform answer to this prob-
lem. The threshold of legitimacy will depend on the decisionmaker's
normative evaluation of what constitutes an acceptable outcome. 154
The extent to which plaintiffs are able to predict their individual
entitlements and the size of the gap between predicted and actual
awards will determine the legitimacy of the results. Acceptability is
therefore a function of the consequences of typicality for distributive
justice. In the strip-search example, for instance, it is possible to imag-
ine a judge not utilizing the plaintiff's previous psychological condi-
tion in setting the parameters of the group because it is a subjective
variable. The result of such a ruling will be that eggshell skull plain-
tiffs will likely receive less in the extrapolation process than they
would have through an individual trial. If eggshell skull plaintiffs are
guaranteed to obtain a higher award in an individual trial than the
average award in a bellwether trial procedure, then they will find the
bellwether trial procedure unacceptable. But if the results of an indi-
vidual trial are highly unpredictable or the difference between the
154 As Bone explains,
[alithough people will disagree over the proper threshold since it depends on one's
normative view of acceptable outcomes, there are bound to be easy cases. For
instance, a sampling procedure that virtually guaranteed a level of recovery for
high-damage plaintiffs far below their entitlements would be unacceptable even if it
made committee participation possible for everyone.
Bone, supra note 2, at 637.
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amount awarded the eggshell skull plaintiffs in the sample trials and
the average award is not so great as to merit the costs of an individual
litigation from a plaintiff's perspective, then the extrapolation process
will probably be acceptable to them.
The attempt to achieve individual accuracy through group typi-
cality is distorted by the divergence between private and public inter-
ests in litigation.155 The private interests of the plaintiffs are to
maximize their own recovery. Taking into account the costs incurred
by the court system and the defendant, group typicality is preferable
to individualized justice from an efficiency perspective. The problem,
of course, is that litigants are not required to internalize the additional
costs that the judicial system incurs as a result of choosing individu-
ated litigation over collective litigation. The utilitarian calculus that
takes into account all the costs of the litigation is limited by the persis-
tence of autonomy values and process-based rights to participation
that are independent of utilitarian concerns. Plaintiffs' and defend-
ants' objections differ in this regard. Defendants' objections to bell-
wether trials will be utilitarian, whereas plaintiffs' possible objections
concern both distributive justice and autonomy values.
In a bellwether trial procedure, defendants will pay the amount
they would have paid if each individual case were tried. The defend-
ants' objection is likely to be based on disputes as to the accuracy of
the results. In due process terms, the extent of a defendant's property
interest in the litigation is the accuracy of the total amount it is re-
quired to pay out. Under a deterrence theory of tort law, the defen-
dant does not have a cognizable distributive justice interest-that is,
the defendant cannot assert a protectable interest in paying the right
people the right amount. Because "sampling can yield an extremely
accurate average damage figure and thus an accurate total damage
figure for the whole aggregation," the defendant's property interest is
relatively well-protected by bellwether trials. 156
If bellwether trials are so efficient and fair, then why have de-
fendants resisted them?157 It seems likely that defendants have re-
sisted bellwether trial procedures because they prefer repetitive
litigation. Defendants hope to settle more cheaply after either win-
ning sufficient numbers of defense verdicts or as the effort and ex-
pense of defending individual suits wears their adversaries down.
155 See Shavell, supra note 111, at 577.
156 Bone, supra note 2, at 572.
157 For example, the appeals in Cimino and Hilao, discussed supra Part I, were both
brought by the defendants.
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Bellwether trials, by contrast, prevent defendants from waging such a
war of attrition.
The plaintiffs' objection to group typical justice is rooted in both
distributive justice and process-based autonomy values. First, plain-
tiffs are subjected to a redistribution of wealth from the highest-value
claims to the lowest in an averaging regime such as that used in bell-
wether trials. Secondly, extrapolation plaintiffs are denied the oppor-
tunity to participate in the resolution of their individual cases. This
important autonomy objection is addressed next.
B. The Autonomy Objection and Due Process
Autonomy requires that each individual plaintiff have a right to
participate in the proceeding that determines his entitlements. 58 The
autonomy objection to bellwether trials can be asserted by the extra-
polation plaintiff, who is denied the ability to participate in the bell-
wether trials but forced to accept their results. The defendant is not
entitled to assert this objection because the defendant actually partici-
pates in the bellwether trials. In the context of damages class actions,
which pose an analogous problem to that presented by bellwether trial
procedures, due process requires the right to notice, an opportunity to
be heard, the right to exclude oneself from the proceeding, and ade-
quate representation of absent plaintiffs. 15 9 Extrapolation plaintiffs in
mandatory bellwether trial procedures are not entitled to an individ-
ual hearing, but instead are awarded the results of someone else's
hearing. Is group typical justice compatible with the autonomy values
that animate our traditional due process doctrines? This Part argues
that it is, when the loss of autonomy is offset by democratic gains.
Scholars analyzing the issue of statistical adjudication such as the
extrapolation process in a bellwether trial have rightfully focused on
autonomy concerns and on the question of whether the utilitarian ar-
guments favoring economies of scale justify these severe limitations
on process-based rights. In one of the most thorough treatments of
the problems raised by such procedures, Robert Bone has argued that
only in cases of extreme process scarcity should outcome be priori-
158 See Frank Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, in
DUE PROCESS: NoMos XVIII 126-28, 154 n.4 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds., 1977); Deborah L.
Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1198 (1982) ("[R]espect for
individual dignity, autonomy, and self-expression demands that those with rights directly at risk
have an adequate means of registering their concerns.").
159 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 803 (1985).
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tized over process.160 Similarly, in his analysis of procedural justice,
Lawrence Solum argues that if individual participation is impractica-
ble, then litigants should be offered the most accurate determination
at the lowest possible cost. 61 It makes perfect sense from a pragmatic
perspective to say that under conditions where the realization of au-
tonomy values is impracticable, litigants ought to settle for an efficient
procedure that maximizes accuracy and minimizes costs. Mass torts
represent a category of cases where there is no realistic possibility of
individual participation, and therefore more utilitarian procedural ap-
proaches are justified.
A significant problem with this argument is that it ignores the
source of process scarcity. For example, if the legislature decides to
severely limit funding of the court system, does this mean that the due
process right to a hearing may be dispensed with? Under such condi-
tions the courts must be permitted to rule that the creation of the
condition of extreme process scarcity is itself a violation of due pro-
cess and, in federal court, Article III. Similarly, in the case of mass
torts, legislatures could increase funding to the court system so that
each individual case could be heard individually. Courts that find
bellwether trials to be unconstitutional violations of individual right to
participation may be saying to the legislature that additional funding
or a legislative solution is needed. Some judges have even made this
point explicitly in the asbestos context.162
The pragmatic approach to bellwether trials taken here, which ar-
gues that the absence of a viable litigation alternative justifies group
typical justice, is vulnerable to this critique. The conditions of the
courts are not static. The political economy of the administration of
justice can change and is subject to influence from the courts, legisla-
tures, and citizens, who are themselves also participants in the legal
system. If courts are willing to accept group typical justice because
individual justice is impracticable, this may increase the chances that
individual justice continues to be impracticable or becomes even more
impracticable over time. The availability of a viable alternative to in-
160 See Bone, supra note 2, at 634 ("If there is not enough to go around, a condition of
scarcity exists, and cases must be aggregated to distribute the available process goods fairly.").
161 See Solum, supra note 2, at 320.
162 See, e.g., Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 339 (5th Cir. 1998) (Garza, J.,
concurring) ("[A]sbestos-related injuries have presented the courts with an unmanageable situa-
tion, which has resulted in an inadequate method of compensation for such injuries, both from
the plaintiffs' and defendants' point of view. As such, I join Judge Hogan in urging Congress to
formulate an administrative claim procedure for dealing with claims for asbestos-related injuries
modeled on the Black Lung legislation.").
20081
The George Washington Law Review
dividuated justice may result in the long-term diminishment of litigant
autonomy as group typical justice becomes accepted and resources are
reduced accordingly. In sum, group typical justice may reproduce
itself.163
Resisting group typical justice, however, is also damaging to indi-
viduals. In the short term, resistance to group typical justice is likely
to result in more privatization of justice through aggregated settle-
ments and settlement-only class actions. In aggregate settlements, liti-
gant autonomy is simply nonexistent. Plaintiffs are offered
settlements consisting of standardized amounts reached through pri-
vate attorney negotiation, without their participation and without the
realistic possibility of adjudication.164 There is not much hope for an
injection of funding into the court system to guarantee individuated
process to mass tort plaintiffs.165 Assuming that funding for the courts
is not likely to be dramatically increased, the availability of a litigated
solution through bellwether trials, even though it limits autonomy, is
better than the alternative of privatized, standardized settlements.
In addition to being preferable to the currently available alterna-
tives, bellwether trials offer another benefit. Because they realize the
democracy-promoting values of the jury trial, bellwether trials
strengthen the legitimacy of the court system more than privately ad-
ministered settlements reached in the absence of a realistic litigation
alternative. Although bellwether procedures reduce the participation
of extrapolation plaintiffs, they increase participation of citizens in the
court system by involving the jury in a category of cases from which
private settlements have largely excluded it.166 Thus, there are other
dignity and process-based participation values that are realized in bell-
wether trials. These democratic values should be given greater weight
than they currently are.
One obvious response to the autonomy problem is that litigants
should be permitted to opt out of mandatory bellwether trial proce-
dures and obtain their own trial. This is the standard liberal solution
to the existence of coercive groups. 167 The opportunity to exclude
163 See Deborah R. Hensler, Has the Fat Lady Sung? The Future of Mass Toxic Torts, 26
REV. LIrIa. 883, 893 (2007); Francis McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73 TEX. L.
REV. 1821, 1827-36 (1995) (calling this tendency of mass torts to expand "elasticity").
164 See Hensler, supra note 112.
165 See supra notes 32-57 and accompanying text (describing asbestos litigation).
166 See Galanter, supra note 106, at 466-67 (discussing downward trend in number of jury
trials).
167 "Exit is a bedrock liberal value .... " Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal
Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549, 567 (2001).
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oneself and obtain an individual trial should assuage autonomy con-
cerns because it preserves litigant autonomy through exit. But opt-
outs create a very serious problem for bellwether trial procedures. If
litigants are permitted to opt out, then all litigants who believe that
their award is likely to be above the average award will opt out. This
will predictably reduce the average award. Because they predict that
the average value will be lower than their entitlement, all litigants ex-
cept for those with the very lowest-value claims-claims that are not
otherwise worth litigating-will opt out, severely limiting the value of
the procedure. 168 Yet forbidding opt-outs is an unrealistic solution.
The right to opt out is firmly entrenched in our legal system and it is
highly unlikely that courts will dispense with the opt-out requirement
for bellwether trials given our longstanding tradition of valuing auton-
omy in litigation. 169
If plaintiffs really do opt out en mass as the model in the previous
paragraph would predict, this is an indication that the procedure cre-
ates fundamentally unfair results for large numbers of plaintiffs, such
as awards well below their anticipated entitlement. Unlike a class ac-
tion settlement situation, where the defendant is eager to obtain
"global peace" and may condition its acquiescence to a settlement on
a limitation on the number of opt-outs, a bellwether trial procedure
would be judicially mandated, and the purpose would not be global
peace but rather fair resolution by a jury of as many cases as possible.
If enough plaintiffs choose to opt out to derail a bellwether trial pro-
cedure, this may be the systemically best and most fair outcome.
When properly administered, opt-outs provide an indication that the
variables chosen by the court do not provide acceptable results.
Practical realities may make opting out undesirable for plaintiffs.
Litigant information about outcomes is imperfect. As a result, liti-
gants who are uncertain as to the outcome of their case are not as
likely to opt out because they cannot predict if their award will be
higher or lower than the average. If litigants are sufficiently unsure of
what their ultimate award will be, they may be unable to judge
168 I am grateful to Ariel Porat and Robert Bone for this point. But see Michael A. Perino,
Class Action Chaos? The Theory of the Core and an Analysis of Opt-Out Rights in Mass Tort
Class Actions, 46 EMORY L.J. 85 (1997) (applying game theoretic principles to opt-outs in mass
tort class actions and concluding, based on core theory, that court-imposed limitations on these
opt-out rights are sometimes warranted).
169 See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989) (referring to "our deep-rooted historic
tradition that everyone should have his own day in court" (internal quotation marks omitted));
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (holding that due process requires
right to opt out in damages class actions).
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whether the extrapolation award is sufficiently below what they can
expect at trial to justify opting out and the attendant litigation costs.
In many cases, plaintiff's lawyers are also likely to discourage their
clients from opting out if their interest is in resolving as many cases as
possible as quickly as possible.
This picture may be different for lawyers with a few high-value
claims. Because attorneys have their own interests with respect to the
outcome, it is not clear that attorney intervention necessarily will be in
the best interests of plaintiffs who would otherwise opt out. Addition-
ally, this question may be complicated by the ability of defendants to
settle selected bellwether cases, and in so doing either manipulate out-
comes or scuttle the process altogether. Special rules would have to
be adopted to prevent this from happening.
The history of attempts to conduct mandatory bellwether trials
indicates that massive opt-outs are unlikely to be a problem. In
Cimino v. Raymark Industries, Inc., plaintiffs were willing participants
in the bellwether trial procedure and defendants opposed it.170 Simi-
larly, in Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, plaintiffs did not object to the bell-
wether trial procedure.' 7' Plaintiff acceptance of bellwether trials may
be read as a testament to the state of process scarcity in which they
find themselves.
It is by no means clear, however, that plaintiffs who do not opt
out are voluntarily consenting to the procedure. We know, for exam-
ple, that failure to object to standardized settlement in class actions or
aggregative litigation does not mean that plaintiffs voluntarily consent
to these settlements. A failure to object to collective procedures may
merely reflect a lack of resources. It is very difficult to justify bell-
wether trial procedures by recourse to consent because of this reality
in mass litigation.
A Rawlsian contractarian approach may be of some assistance to
thinking about this issue. 72 In a recent article, David Dana applied
such an analysis to mass tort class actions. 173 Although there is insuffi-
170 Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990), rev'd, 151 F.3d 297
(5th Cir. 1998); see supra Part I.A.
171 Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996), affg In re Estate of Marcos
Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. 1460 (D. Haw. 1995); see supra Part I.B.
172 See generally RAwts, supra note 92 (describing Rawls' theory that the principles of jus-
tice are those that individuals would choose if they were placed behind a veil of ignorance in
which they understand themselves to be in a hypothetical situation of equal liberty, not knowing
their own social status, talents, etcetera).
173 See David A. Dana, Adequacy of Representation After Stephenson: A Rawlsian/Behav-
ioral Economics Approach to Class Action Settlements, 55 EMORY L.J. 279, 292-300 (2006) (ap-
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cient space here to do his argument justice, a sketch of Dana's analysis
is useful. Under this approach, mass tort plaintiffs who are in an
"original position" do not know the extent of their injury, and they
know there is uncertainty as to their entitlements. Dana assumes that
people will agree to the fundamental principle that persons with equal
injury are entitled to equal remuneration. 174 If this is the case, plain-
tiffs will likely agree to a procedure that departs from the default re-
gime of an individual trial when there is a gain from that procedure.
Such a gain might be that plaintiffs receive more than they would have
otherwise because of the savings in litigation costs and delays. Under
this analysis, whether plaintiffs find a particular bellwether trial proce-
dure acceptable will depend on the extent of the predictable spread
between awards, their faith in the variables chosen to measure entitle-
ment, and the possibility of recouping some savings from administra-
tive costs. This analysis does not account for individual insistence on a
process-based right to participation for its own sake.
Whether bellwether trials are preferable to the realities of indi-
vidual litigation is both an empirical and a normative question. But in
weighing two incommensurable goods-the economies of scale and
benefits of group typicality to society and to individual plaintiffs as
against the dignity and autonomy values offered by individualized par-
ticipation-the bellwether trial adds a third value. Because it involves
the jury in the decisionmaking process, the bellwether trial reaffirms
the value of adjudicated results and democratic involvement in deci-
sionmaking. The affirmation of public values, although not a cure for
autonomy concerns, adds another benefit to the bellwether trial pro-
cedure beyond purely utilitarian justification. Focusing on democratic
values is also consistent with the nature of mass torts, in which
thousands are subjected to the same injury, most often as a result of
regulatory failure. The procedural mechanism is therefore suited to
the harm.
C. The Seventh Amendment Objection
Critics have argued that bellwether trials violate both due process
and the Seventh Amendment. The due process analysis boils down to
the trade-off between utilitarian and process-based participation val-
plying Rawls's theory to class actions and concluding that a right to challenge certain types of
class actions settlements is necessary).
174 See id. at 299.
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ues discussed above. 175 Courts considering the due process question
have uniformly held that bellwether trials do not violate the Due Pro-
cess Clause when they use valid statistical methodology. 176 The effect
of bellwether trials on the jury right has been a far more serious stum-
bling block.177
The Seventh Amendment establishes that "[i]n suits at common
law ... the right of trial by jury shall be preserved .... ",178 The jury
right has long been understood to attach to tort suits brought in fed-
eral courts sitting in diversity, where many (although by no means all)
mass tort cases end up. In analyzing the jury right, the court will in-
quire whether the case before it is one that would have been tried at
law or in equity in 1791, the year that the Seventh Amendment was
ratified. 179 This is known as the "historical test" and has been the sub-
ject of much criticism by judges and scholars.180 If the jury right at-
taches and an alteration of the jury procedure is proposed, the court
will consider the novel procedure in light of the purposes of trial by
jury to "assure a fair and equitable resolution of factual issues" and in
light of current needs, such as the efficient administration of justice.18'
The Supreme Court has upheld procedures that limit the jury's deci-
sionmaking power and were unknown at common law, including non-
mutual issue preclusion, the use of auditors, judgments as a matter of
175 See generally Bone, supra note 2 (providing a thorough discussion of due process in the
context of statistical adjudication).
176 In re Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 109 F.3d 1016, 1020-21 (5th Cir. 1997); Hilao v. Estate of
Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 786-87 (9th Cir. 1996). But cf In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706,
711-12 (5th Cir. 1990).
177 The Seventh Amendment question has been touched upon, but not adequately ana-
lyzed. See Glen 0. Robinson & Kenneth S. Abraham, Collective Justice in Tort Law, 78 VA. L.
REV. 1481, 1496-99 (1992) (concluding that jury right is subordinate to due process analysis); R.
Joseph Barton, Note, Utilizing Statistics and Bellwether Trials in Mass Torts: What Do the Consti-
tution and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Permit?, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 199, 221-35
(1999) (concluding that mandatory bellwether trials are unconstitutional).
178 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The analysis in this Article focuses on the federal jury right
because the federal courts are faced with many such cases. This discussion may also be usefully
applied to state jury provisions in some cases. See, e.g., Bruce D. Greenberg & Gary K.
Wolinetz, The Right to a Civil Jury Trial in New Jersey, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 1461, 1485-501
(1995) (comparing New Jersey and federal jury rights).
179 The origin of this test is Justice Story's circuit opinion in United States v. Wonson, 28 F.
Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750). For a more recent statement of this test, see City
of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 708 (1999).
180 See Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 574-81
(1990) (Brennan, J., concurring) (suggesting historical test should be simplified); Charles W.
Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 731-47
(1973) (criticizing the historical test and proposing a "dynamic" reading).
181 Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 157 (1973) (upholding six-person civil juries).
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law, and remittitur. 182 Bellwether trials, by contrast to these proce-
dures, increase the jury's power.
The Fifth Circuit's decision that bellwether trials violate the de-
fendant's Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial has been influential
despite its poor reasoning.183 Since then no mandatory bellwether
trial procedure has been attempted, although informal bellwether trial
procedures have flourished. 8 4 Judges seem to want to use this innova-
tive procedure but believe that they are constitutionally constrained
from doing so. 185
In fact, bellwether trials do not violate the jury right. First, the
attachment of the jury right need not be an all-or-nothing proposition.
The jury right can attach for some purposes and not others. A more
flexible approach to the attachment of the jury right can be found by
analogy to the common-law doctrine of the feigned issue procedure.
Second, when bellwether trials are compared to other, modern proce-
dures that limit the role of the jury and introduce probabilistic think-
ing, it is clear that a bellwether trial procedure does not alter the
"basic institution" of the jury and is therefore constitutional.18 6 For
example, the doctrine of nonmutual collateral estoppel legitimates the
use of bellwether trials by permitting a previous decision in which a
party did not participate to bind that party. Third, the bellwether trial
can be analogized to other permissible streamlining procedures, such
as the use of auditors. Finally, the procedure bears similarities to the
constitutionally permissible doctrine of remittitur.
1. A Hybrid Jury Right
Mass torts represent a clash between the modern industrial world
of mass harms and an eighteenth-century world in which probabilistic
thinking was still in its nascent stages. Eighteenth-century judicial in-
182 See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (upholding nonmutual col-
lateral estoppel); Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 485 (1935) (upholding remittitur); Ex parte
Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 310 (1920) (upholding use of auditors).
183 See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 312, 319 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that
bellwether trials violate defendant's right to try each plaintiff's case before a jury).
184 See supra note 6 (listing cases using informal bellwether trial procedures).
185 See In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ("MTBE") Prod. Liab. Litig., Master File No.
1:00-1898, MDL No. 1358 (SAS), No. M21-88, 2007 WL 2781946, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2007)
(implying that because court was not extrapolating results of bellwether trials, objections to the
bellwether trial procedure were unwarranted).
186 See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 392 (1943) ("[T]he Amendment was de-
signed to preserve the basic institution of jury trial in only its most fundamental elements, not
the great mass of procedural forms and details, varying even then so widely among common-law
jurisdictions.").
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stitutions such as the jury seem unequipped to handle mass torts be-
cause these types of cases were unknown at that time. The significant
differences between the legal and economic world of 1791 and today
make it very difficult to reason analogically from historical categories.
As a result, courts must look to "precedent and functional considera-
tions" rather than relying solely on the formal categories of law and
equity in determining the attachment of the jury right.187
There are practices that existed during the founding period that
set precedents for innovative approaches to modern problems. Look-
ing to such practices for guidance is superior to the search for a direct
analogy. One such helpful precedent is the procedural overlap be-
tween common-law and equity courts in the eighteenth century, which
was achieved through the feigned issue procedure. Because the equity
and common-law courts were separate, jurisdictional fictions had to
be created for facts from a case in equity to be tried at law.188 The
feigned issue procedure was such a legal fiction. When the equity
chancellor wanted an issue to be determined by a jury, he did not have
the power to convene a jury or refer the issue to the common-law
court to be so tried. Instead, the parties would file a new action in the
common-law court that was styled as a wager between them concern-
ing the question at issue in the equity action. The jury would deter-
mine the winner of the wager and in the process be required to
determine the underlying fact that was the subject of the wager.
Blackstone described the procedure as follows:
[I]f any matter of fact is strongly controverted, this court is
so sensible of the deficiency of trial by written depositions,
that it will not bind the parties thereby, but usually directs
the matter to be tried by jury .... But, as no jury can be
summoned to attend this court, the fact is usually directed to
be tried at the bar of the court of king's bench or at the as-
sises, upon a feigned issue. For... an action is feigned to be
brought wherein the pretended plaintiff declares, that he laid
a wager of 51. with the defendant, that A was heir at law to B;
and then avers that he is so; and brings his action for the 51.
The defendant allows the wager, but avers that A is not the
187 City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 718 (1999); cf. Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 378 (1996) (asserting the primacy of analogical
reasoning).
188 See Harold Chesnin & Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Chancery Procedure and the Seventh
Amendment: Jury Trial of Issues in Equity Cases Before 1791, 83 YALE L.J. 999 (1974) (describ-
ing various procedural methods by which courts of law and equity shared jurisdiction in England
and the American colonies).
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heir to B; and thereupon that issue is joined, which is di-
rected out of chancery to be tried: and thus the verdict of the
jurors at law determines the fact in the court of equity.18 9
The feigned issue procedure shares some similarities with the ad-
visory jury procedure already codified in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, except that the jury's findings were binding.190
The existence of the feigned issue procedure was recognized in
1780s America prior to the adoption of the Seventh Amendment. The
"Democratic Federalist," writing in support of enshrining the right to
a jury trial in the original Constitution, wrote: "Whenever a difference
arises about a matter of fact in the courts of equity in America or
England, the fact is sent down to the courts of common law to be tried
by a jury, and it is what the lawyers call a feigned issue." 191 There
were other, similar hybrid procedures. In New Jersey, for example,
the equity court was permitted by statute to direct an action at law
and retain jurisdiction over it.192 These types of procedures were un-
derstood to be a means for deciding cases that were not amenable to
clear determinations by the chancellor, such as land valuation or
fraud.193 Valuing damages in tort cases is similarly difficult.
Feigned issue and similar procedures shed light on the constitu-
tionality of bellwether trials. The right to a trial by jury need not be
understood as all or nothing, determined solely by the formalist dis-
tinctions between law and equity. Instead of trying each case to a jury
individually or trying none, the bellwether trial permits the judge to
189 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 452 (Oceana
Publ'ns 1967) (1772).
190 See FED. R. Civ. P. 39(c).
191 A Democratic Federalist (Oct. 17, 1787), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION,
supra note 100, at 354. Hamilton replied to this argument:
It has been erroneously insinuated, with regard to the court of chancery, that this
court generally tries disputed facts by a jury. The truth is, that references to a jury
in that court rarely happen, and are in no case necessary, but where the validity of a
devise of land comes into question.
THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 104, at 361. The truth is probably
somewhere between these two extremes.
192 See Miller v. Wack, 1 N.J. Eq. 204, 215 (1834). Strictly speaking, this evidence is outside
the timeframe of the historical test.
193 In O'Connor v. Cook, (1803) 32 Eng. Rep. 463, 463 (Eldon, L.C.), the Lord Chancellor
noted the possibility of manipulation of land value, especially where the owner might be in
possession of parcels of land with different values. Rather than deciding the manner in which
value would be computed himself, the Chancellor assigned this difficult task to the jury's judg-
ment. See also Miller, 1 N.J. Eq. at 215 (holding that feigned issues should be used "in cases of
real difficulty, growing out of contradictory testimony; or opposing facts and circumstances,
which it is impossible for the court to reconcile").
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try some cases and apply the information obtained from those verdicts
to the remaining cases. In so doing, the bellwether trial provides what
might be called a hybrid version of the jury right. The jury right can
apply to fact-finding in the litigation as a whole, but not necessarily to
each individual case, because some cases are resolved by extrapola-
tion instead of being awarded individual verdicts. To achieve this as a
formal matter, courts can hold that the jury right attaches to the sam-
ple plaintiffs' trials but not the extrapolation process, almost as though
these were two separate proceedings, one at law and the other in eq-
uity. 194 Another option is for a jury to make the final extrapolation
determination as well as render verdicts in individual bellwether trials.
A hybrid procedure combining the jurisdictions of law and equity per-
mits a creative approach to the jury trial and permits the courts to
retain it as means of introducing democratic values into the justice
system.
The analogy to the feigned issue procedure illustrates one of the
strongest criticisms of the common-law writ system: its interminable
formalism. 95 I do not advocate returning to the days when litigants
were forced to style a claim as a wager to be heard.196 We need not do
so because judges can interpret the law to recognize this hybridization
outright. A legal fiction such as the feigned issue works its way into
the law by common usage and in so doing expands the law.197 The
194 See Samuel Issacharoff, Administering Damage Awards in Mass-Tort Litigation, 10 REV.
LITIG. 463, 487 (1991) ("The use of the class action in mass-tort cases represents two very sepa-
rate proceedings with differing [S]eventh [A]mendment implications. The first concerns the le-
gal action of plaintiffs as a group against the alleged tortfeasor; in this action the [S]eventh
[A]mendment right to trial by jury clearly applies. The second aspect relates to an administra-
tive procedure established by the equitable powers of the court that allows for the determination
of individual entitlements independent of the claims against defendants.").
195 See JOHN HAMILTON BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 66-67,
80-81 (Butterworths 3d ed. 1990) (1971) (describing the formalism of the English writ system
and nineteenth-century reactions to it). The contrast between law and equity was complicated in
the colonies. The political importance of these distinctions for the colonists is discussed in the
text accompanying notes 94-95, supra.
196 The feigned issue procedure fell out of favor in the nineteenth century because it was
perceived as permitting too much litigant abuse, especially as a way to bring cases without mean-
ingful opposition. See Chesnin & Hazard, supra note 185, at 1010 (describing the fall out of
favor in English courts beginning in the 1790s through the 1830s and noting that the practice was
eliminated in 1845); see also Lindsay G. Robertson, "A Mere Feigned Case": Rethinking the
Fletcher v. Peck Conspiracy and Early Republican Legal Culture, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 249, 263
(arguing that in America the "tide was turning against the use of feigned issues" by 1810 due to
abuse of this procedure by land speculators).
197 JOHN HAMILTON BAKER, THE LAw's Two BODIES: SOME EVIDENTIAL PROBLEMS IN
ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 54-55 (2001); see also Lon L. Fuller, Legal Fictions, 25 ILL. L. REV.
513, 518-29 (1930) (describing legal fictions as transitional devices).
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objection to a legal fiction "from the point of view of jurisprudence, is
not so much that it is untrue-after all, it deceives nobody and has no
dishonest purpose-but that it works off the record, without overt le-
gal reasoning, and therefore suppresses principle."' 198 For this reason,
the hybridization of the jury right in mass tort cases should be recog-
nized directly.
The main objection to a hybridized view of the jury right is that
any limitations on the jury right constitute impermissible erosions of
that right. Such objectors assume the jury right to be a zero-sum pro-
cedure. In this view, hybridizing the jury procedure is merely a way of
eliminating the jury right for hundreds or thousands of plaintiffs. As
Justice Rehnquist explained, "nearly any change in the province of the
jury, no matter how drastic the diminution of its functions, can always
be denominated 'procedural reform."' 199 The Supreme Court has rec-
ognized that the jury right is not zero-sum in other contexts, holding
that the Seventh Amendment "did not bind the federal courts to the
exact procedural incidents or details of jury trial according to the com-
mon law in 1791."200 This was the Antifederalist position as well: "[I]t
is the jury trial we want; the little different appendages and modifica-
tions tacked to it in the different states, are no more than a drop in the
ocean .... "201 Nevertheless, Justice Rehnquist was correct in his ob-
servation that drawing the line between what is simply an appendage
and what goes to the substance of the right is difficult. It is essential
to recognize that a refusal to deviate in any way from the common-law
procedures surrounding the jury right requires courts to ignore the
realities of modern litigation and potentially erodes the right even
more than recognizing modern doctrines does. Bellwether trials
should be adopted by jury proponents because they will strengthen
rather than weaken the institution of the jury right and its underlying
policy goals.
Over the past 200 years, the courts have accepted many changes
to the jury trial of similar scope to the bellwether trial. Many of these
changes have limited the jury right in instances where it would other-
wise be available. By contrast, bellwether trials reintroduce the jury
198 BAKER, supra note 197, at 55.
199 Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 346 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see
also Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 397 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Court has eroded the right to a jury trial).
200 Galloway, 319 U.S. at 390; see also id. at 391 ("Nor were the 'rules of the common law'
then prevalent ... crystallized in a fixed and immutable system.").
201 Federal Farmer No. 16 (Jan. 20, 1788), reprinted in THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION,
supra note 100, at 358.
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into an area of litigation from which it has been largely excluded for
practical reasons. The remainder of this Part compares the bellwether
trials with previously accepted limiting procedures.
2. Nonmutual Issue Preclusion
By abandoning the requirement of mutuality in issue preclusion,
the Supreme Court arguably limited the right to a jury trial. The com-
mon-law rule was that to preclude a party from litigating an issue in a
second action, the same party must have participated in the first ac-
tion. Mutuality remains a requirement for claim preclusion. The Su-
preme Court rejected the doctrine of mutuality with respect to issue
preclusion and held that a plaintiff may foreclose a defendant from
relitigating an issue that the same defendant had previously litigated
unsuccessfully in an action with another party if the plaintiff could not
have easily joined the prior suit and preclusion would not be unfair to
the defendant.20 2 The application of the doctrine of nonmutual collat-
eral estoppel shifts the question from whether or not the litigant got a
jury trial to whether the issue was fully and fairly litigated.
To better understand the application of issue preclusion to bell-
wether trials, it is helpful to recall the facts of Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore,203 the Supreme Court case adopting the doctrine of nonmutual-
ity. Parklane was a shareholder derivative class action alleging that
Parklane Hosiery and its officers and directors had issued a materially
false and misleading proxy statement in connection with a merger.204
Before the action came to trial, the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion ("SEC") filed a second lawsuit against the company making simi-
lar allegations that the proxy statement contained materially false and
misleading information. 20 5 Because the SEC action was injunctive, no
jury was empanelled. A bench trial was held in the government's suit;
the district court found the defendant liable and issued a declaratory
judgment.206 The plaintiffs in the first lawsuit sought to take advan-
tage of this outcome by precluding Parklane from relitigating the
question of whether the disclosures in the proxy statement were mate-
rially false and misleading.2 7 The Supreme Court held that plaintiffs
202 Parklane, 439 U.S. at 331-32, 337.
203 See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 337 (1979).
204 Id. at 324.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id.
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could preclude the company from relitigating the issue even though
the plaintiffs were not parties to the first lawsuit. 20 8
Defendants did not receive a jury trial, yet the Court held that the
Seventh Amendment was not violated.20 9 The Court's reasoning be-
gan with the historical test.210 Because in 1791 judicial findings of fact
in equity could be preclusive over factual issues at law, the right to a
jury as defined in the Seventh Amendment was not violated by the
doctrine of nonmutual collateral estoppel. 211 As the Court explained,
both in cases of mutual and nonmutual issue preclusion, "there is no
further factfinding function for the jury to perform, since the common
factual issues have been resolved in the previous action. 2 12 Because
parties could use findings of fact in equity to preclude relitigation in
common-law courts in 1791, it did not violate the defendant's right to
a jury trial to preclude litigation of the misrepresentation issue based
on the adverse judicial ruling in the SEC injunctive action.2 13
The Supreme Court's adoption of nonmutuality expresses a flexi-
ble approach to the historical test, similar to the hybrid approach pro-
posed above. A less charitable characterization is that the Court
chose the doctrines that it liked from 1791, and ignored the ones that
it did not. The Court used the existence of an alternative, though by
no means dispositive, aspect of preclusion doctrine to admit policy
considerations that would have been foreclosed by the direct applica-
tion of the historical test. The policy issues that were of more pressing
concern to the Court in Parklane were the efficiency of the court sys-
tem, risk of inconsistent judgments, and unfairness to defendants. 214
These efficiency and fairness concerns are similar to the policy
considerations that support the use of bellwether trials. For example,
with mandatory bellwether trials, courts seek to avoid situations in
which litigants cherry-pick judgments to use against the other party.
Instead of a system with numerous trials held one after the other,
where defendants and plaintiffs try their luck in the court system, the
208 Id. at 332-33.
209 Id. at 337.
210 See id. at 333.
211 See id. at 333 n.21.
212 Id. at 336.
213 Id. at 335 (citing Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 339 (1966) (holding that "an equitable
determination can have collateral-estoppel effect in a subsequent legal action and that this estop-
pel does not violate the Seventh Amendment")).
214 See id. at 329-31. I deduce the Court's priorities from the fact that the Court analyzed
the policy arguments first and addressed the Seventh Amendment issue almost as an after-
thought. Cf. id. at 333.
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sampling approach of bellwether trials limits needless repetition and
minimizes the lottery aspect of tort trials. Recognizing the risk of in-
consistent judgments that can result because different juries may
render different verdicts in similar cases, the bellwether trial proce-
dure sets out to determine an acceptable outcome using statistical
tools. Litigating a random sample of cases is an efficient way to estab-
lish a probabilistic award without permitting a single chance outcome
to determine numerous cases.
The most obvious application of nonmutual collateral estoppel in
the bellwether trial context is offensively, against defendants, as it was
used in Parklane.215 In such a case, the plaintiffs would have to meet
the four-part test articulated by the Supreme Court in Parklane: (1)
the same issue must have been fairly and fully litigated in a previous
proceeding;2 16 (2) the resolution of the issue must have been necessary
to the outcome of the first action;217 (3) the plaintiff must not have
been able to join the first action easily;218 and (4) the application of
preclusion must not be unfair to defendant. 2 9 In the bellwether trial
context, a court can preclude the defendant from relitigating in extra-
polation cases those issues that have been fully litigated in the sample
trials.
Whether preclusion doctrine can be used to preclude defendants
from relitigating extrapolation cases in bellwether trials turns on the
limits of the definition of "same issue." Consider the September 11th
litigation discussed in Part I, in which Judge Hellerstein decided to
hold a set of sample trials. 220 In those trials, the jury would have de-
termined a damage award for plaintiffs with certain characteristics.
Arguably, other plaintiffs whose cases were not tried but share the
same characteristics present the same damages issue and therefore can
be subject to issue preclusion. To bind the defendant in subsequent
September 11th cases to the damages awards in the sample cases
would require holding that these cases present the same issue. The
defendant could then be precluded from relitigating the issues of the
sample cases in any extrapolation case.
The "same issue" question returns us to the reference class prob-
lem. Litigants may argue that the issues in any two September 11th
215 See id. at 329.
216 Id. at 328.
217 Id. at 326.
218 Id. at 331.
219 Id.
220 See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
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damages cases are not the same because the plaintiffs have different
objectively determinable characteristics, such as previous income. Al-
ternatively, they may argue that the issues could never be the same
because individuals are too different based on subjective variables,
such as the plaintiff's winning personality or credibility on the stand.
This question can be framed doctrinally as a due process concern: to
what extent is the justice system able to accept probabilistic predic-
tions of likely outcomes in place of individualized hearings presenting
particularistic evidence? In light of this concern, how similar does the
same issue have to be? Statistical analysis attempts to flatten differ-
ences between individuals to make generalizations. Whether those
generalizations are acceptable turns, to some extent, on whether
courts can isolate and objectively choose the variables that actually
determine damages awards in jury trials. If so, then the issues in the
sample cases and the extrapolation cases will be the same and the doc-
trine of collateral estoppel can properly apply. If not, then the defen-
dant should be entitled to a trial on each different issue raised with
respect to each of the extrapolation plaintiffs. The trick from a social
science perspective, then, is isolating sufficient explanatory variables
that can both serve the identity requirement of the doctrine and be
determined.
Once framed as a question of issue preclusion, the analysis turns
on the fullness of the hearing rather than on the nature of the deci-
sionmaker. As long as the requirements for preclusion are satisfied,
the fact that a jury did not try the factual issue in question is not fatal.
For example, in Parklane, the Court held that even though a jury was
not available in the first injunctive proceeding, because the defendant
had been fully heard it could be precluded from litigating the issue
before a jury.221
Reframing the question of plaintiffs' rights as a preclusion issue
eliminates the jury question and leaves instead the question of how
extrapolation can be justified given that extrapolation plaintiffs have
not had any hearing. The problem with this preclusion argument for
overcoming the Seventh Amendment objection from a plaintiff's per-
spective is that it appears to eliminate the jury right through doctrinal
formalism. Simply reframing the question as one of preclusion-can
the extrapolation plaintiffs be deemed to have been heard through
bellwether trials?-cannot truly resolve the jury issue. One response
to this argument is that unlike Parklane, in a bellwether trial proce-
221 See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 332-33, 337.
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dure the plaintiff does get the benefit of the jury right. Although the
jury does not try the plaintiff's individual case directly, the result
reached is based on a jury's determination of the facts of the bell-
wether cases. In other words, the jury is still the decisionmaker in the
prior adjudication. The right to benefit from that decisionmaker is not
an individual one but rather is applied to the group.
More serious than the jury question is the autonomy objection
raised by the requirement that the issue being litigated in the second
proceeding be the "same issue" as that in the first proceeding. The
autonomy concern is that when collateral estoppel is used to preclude
extrapolation plaintiffs from litigating their cases, persons who did not
have an opportunity to litigate the issue in a prior proceeding are be-
ing denied the opportunity to be heard. Nonmutuality still requires
that the person who is being precluded has had the opportunity to
litigate the issue. At its limits, the preclusion issue thus transforms
into a due process problem.
Representative litigation could provide a solution to this problem
because adequacy of representation can justify preclusion for parties
who did not have an opportunity to participate in the first litigation . 222
Courts have upheld preclusion in the class action context for the same
reasons that they have upheld nonmutual collateral estoppel: permit-
ting plaintiffs to relitigate the issue of certification would multiply liti-
gation. The application of the doctrine of issue preclusion "will stop
such a process in its tracks and hold both sides to a fully litigated out-
come, rather than perpetuating an asymmetric system in which class
counsel can win but never lose. 22 3 To use the class action device,
however, the requirements of the class action rule would have to be
met. This returns the analysis to the definition of the "same" issue
that was raised earlier and to the reference class problem. The answer
comes down once again to the normative decision about the proper
balance between group typicality and individuation in the circum-
stances presented in a given case.
222 See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45 (1940) (requiring adequacy of representation for
class action to have preclusive effect).
223 In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763, 766-67 (7th Cir.
2003) (holding that a decision to deny certification of a nationwide class action precludes ade-
quately represented plaintiffs in that first action from attempting to certify the class in a different
forum).
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3. Streamlining Procedures
Another doctrine that provides a useful analogy for bellwether
trials is the use of auditors to determine which facts are at issue. The
use of auditors has been upheld as a streamlining procedure that does
not rescind the ability of the jury to determine the facts in dispute. In
Ex parte Peterson,22 4 the Supreme Court upheld the costs of an auditor
used to simplify questions for the jury, analogizing the auditor's role
to that of pleading or a preliminary hearing, in which the existence of
facts for the jury to find is determined. 225 The case concerned a
breach of contract action and counterclaim relating to a sale of coal.226
The district court judge appointed an auditor
to make a preliminary investigation as to the facts; hear the
witnesses; examine the accounts of the parties; and make and
file a report in the Office of the Clerk of th[e] Court with a
view to simplifying the issues for the jury; but not to finally
determine any of the issues in this action .... 227
The auditor was further to allocate the facts into ten categories and
provide the jury with his opinion as to those facts. 228 The final factual
determination was to be made by a jury, and the parties were to pay
for the auditor. 229
The Court upheld the use of the auditor's report as prima facie
evidence, obviating the need to introduce evidence of any matter that
the auditor found not to be in dispute.2 30 The Court anticipated that
this procedure would "shorten the jury trial, by reducing both the
number of facts to be established by evidence and the number of
questions in controversy. 12 31 The Court further held that the use of an
auditor was consistent with the Seventh Amendment, emphasizing
that although an auditor of this type was not known in common law,
such "changes are essential to the preservation of the right.' '232
Using an auditor to determine which facts are in dispute is like
summary judgment in that it permits the existence of disputed facts to
be determined by a decisionmaker other than the jury. This is also
similar to the bellwether trial procedure where the variables used in
224 Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920).
225 See id. at 310.
226 See id. at 304.
227 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
228 Id. at 304-05.
229 Id. at 304.
230 Id. at 307.
231 Id.
232 Id. at 309-10.
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extrapolation and the parameters of the reference class are deter-
mined by experts working in conjunction with the judge. In another
permutation of the bellwether trial procedure, an expert may make
recommendations regarding total damages and extrapolation and the
jury can make a final determination. 233 In such a case, control of the
factual determinations leading up to the jury's assessment is retained
by the judge, who oversees the expert's work. Because, as in Peterson,
the jury retains final decisionmaking power, this type of procedure is
permitted under the Seventh Amendment.
Peterson was decided at a time when the courts were becoming
increasingly aware of the beneficial uses of expertise and social sci-
ence methodology. 234 The decision relied on a robust concept of ob-
jectivity. The Court trusted the auditor's objectivity, but did not
consider the extent to which the auditor's discretion in determining
which facts would go to the jury actually required the type of subjec-
tive, factual decisionmaking ordinarily reserved for juries. The capac-
ity and objectivity of such experts as well as social science method-
ology has since come under fire.235 The recognition that statistical
studies and expert opinions may be erroneous, misleading, and biased
does not require rejection of social science methodologies, but it does
require judges to evaluate them critically. 236
4. Remittitur
Judgments as a matter of law permit a judge to substitute her
judgment for that of the jury if the jury's judgment is against the
weight of the evidence. 237 The doctrine of remittitur further permits
the judge to reduce damage awards that she finds to be outliers. A
bellwether trial procedure likewise limits the considerations of the
jury with respect to the extrapolation cases to possibilities that are
within a reasonable range of jury findings.
A motion for judgment as a matter of law requires the judge to
evaluate the evidence to determine if a reasonable jury has a "legally
233 See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 784 (9th Cir. 1996).
234 See generally Rebecca Roiphe, The Most Dangerous Profession, 39 CONN. L. REV. 603,
612 (2007) (describing reliance on expertise to justify the development of the administrative
state during the progressive era).
235 See Tribe, supra note 130, at 1330 (critiquing statistical methodology in trials as mislead-
ing to lay jurors).
236 John J. Donohue III & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the
Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791, 841 (2005) (critiquing empirical claims that death
penalty deters homicides).
237 See FED. R. Civ. P. 50.
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sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue. ' 238 Judg-
ments as a matter of law permit a judge to substitute her judgment for
that of the jury to evaluate the probability of a litigant's success. The
doctrine limits the judge's evaluation of the verdict to the jury's find-
ing on liability.
The doctrine of remittitur permits a judge to go a step further and
evaluate the jury's award. If the judge finds the verdict to be exces-
sive, she can give the plaintiff a choice: accept a lesser amount deter-
mined by the court or elect to try the case again.239 The legal standard
for remittitur is whether the jury award "shocks the conscience. 2 40 In
determining whether a jury award is so excessive that it meets this
standard, the court must look to verdicts for comparable injuries and,
based on these awards, determine whether the award in question is
"within a reasonable range. '241 When determining remittitur on a
state-law claim, a federal court should apply the state standard.242 In
New York, for example, the standard is stricter than the federal remit-
titur standard, requiring the court to determine whether the jury's
award "deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensa-
tion."243
The concept of "reasonable" compensation is probabilistic. A
reasonable verdict is one that is within the normal range of similar
verdicts. Once a judge has determined that the jury verdict is outside
the reasonable range, the most common approach is to remit to the
highest possible verdict that the plaintiff could have obtained. 244 The
238 Id.
239 FED. R. CIv. P. 59; 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY K.
KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2815 (3d ed. 1998) (describing remittitur as "a
practice, now sanctioned by long usage, by which the court may condition a denial of the motion
for a new trial upon the filing by the plaintiff of a remittitur in a stated amount").
240 See, e.g., Kirsch v. Fleet Street, Ltd., 148 F.3d 149, 165 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that a
compensatory damage award may be set aside if "the award is so high as to shock the judicial
conscience and constitute a denial of justice").
241 See Ismail v. Cohen, 899 F.2d 183, 187 (2d Cir. 1996).
242 Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 430-31 (1996).
243 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5501(c) (McKinney 2007). The judge would still provide the maximum
award that would comply with the standard. See Funk v. F & K Supply, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 205,
227 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (remitting $450,000 award to $30,000, which the court found to be the
maximum possible award).
244 11 WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 239, § 2815. Two other approaches, now
rarely used, permit the judge to award either whatever the judge deems appropriate or the mini-
mum amount a jury could have awarded. Id. The rationale for remitting only the minimum
amount a jury could have awarded is that to grant anything more is to deprive the defendant of
his right to a jury trial. Id. This rationale is specious because the jury's award of an excessive
amount could not in any way lead to the conclusion that the minimum available amount is what
a reasonable jury would award.
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rationale for this is that in awarding the excessive amount the jury
intended to award the maximum possible amount, and therefore the
court is justified in awarding the plaintiff that maximal amount with-
out violating defendant's jury right.245 The data set of verdicts is cho-
sen by the judge based on briefs and data presented by the litigants
and usually not gathered or analyzed using rigorous social science
methodology. The courts use a convenience sample to determine the
appropriate amount by basing it on jury awards in similar cases that
happen to have been brought to the court's attention.246 The problem
with this practice is that, in addition to being inaccurate, it permits
judges to systematically reduce the possible range of verdicts. By con-
sistently determining that verdicts fall outside a range, judges can re-
duce over time the range outside which a verdict will be deemed an
outlier that is unreasonable or "shocks the judicial conscience." This
raises the fear of systemic corruption underlying the adoption of the
Seventh Amendment. 247
The Supreme Court discussed remittitur in a perplexing opinion
in Dimick v. Schiedt, in which the Court reasoned that remittitur was
permissible because the judge would not add anything to the verdict,
but only removed the "excess" that should never have been there in
the first place.248 By contrast, the Court rejected the doctrine of ad-
ditur as violating the Seventh Amendment because it adds to the ver-
dict something that the jury did not include. 249 The inconsistency of
the Court's reasoning may lead to the inequitable result that defend-
ants are entitled to specific lower jury verdicts, but plaintiffs are not
entitled to specific higher ones. In any event, in both cases the courts
substitute their judgment regarding a factual finding for that of the
jury. Because there is no objectively verifiable way to measure what a
case is "worth," both doctrines interfere with the jury's verdict. Un-
less the plaintiff elects a new trial, the judge's determination, not that
of the jury, will prevail. Both additur and remittitur also depend on
probabilistic thinking. The judge will determine with reference to past
245 See 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 2815 (2d ed. 1995).
246 See 1 SAGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH METHODS 197 (Michael S.
Lewis-Beck, Alan Bryman & Tim Futing Liao eds., 2003) (defining a convenience sample as a
nonprobabilistic sample readily available to the researcher).
247 See supra notes 101-05 (discussing role of the jury as a bulwark against corruption in the
judicial branch).
248 Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935).
249 Id. Additur is permitted in some states. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Manfredi, 679 P.2d 251,
255 (Nev. 1984) (upholding additur in products liability case).
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verdicts whether the verdict before her is within a range of reasonable
verdicts (or, in other words, within "normal" range).250 This is a very
rough form of statistical methodology, not least because the judge's
determination in remitted cases is based on an analysis of a conve-
nience sample.
The methodology for determining outcomes in a remittitur differs
from a bellwether trial procedure in three ways. First, in a bellwether
trial procedure the extrapolation plaintiffs are not entitled to the max-
imum amount reached by the sample plaintiffs, but to a reasonable
amount determined by social science methods, such as an average
award. Second, in some permutations of the bellwether trial proce-
dure the jury can determine the extrapolation amount, whereas remit-
titur requires a judge to displace the jury's findings with her own
unless the plaintiff decides to relitigate. Third, if the verdict is remit-
ted, the plaintiff has an opportunity to reject the remittitur and reliti-
gate. A mandatory bellwether trial procedure, by contrast, does not
necessarily provide the option to opt out after the extrapolation
process.251
The strongest counterargument to this analogy is that there re-
mains a fundamental difference between remittitur doctrine and bell-
wether trials: remittitur aims to give the plaintiff a judgment in line
with what a reasonable verdict should be, whereas bellwether trials
aim to give plaintiffs extrapolated verdicts that are not tightly tailored
to their individual entitlements.25 2 In other words, remittitur doctrine
is animated by accuracy whereas bellwether trials are animated by
standardization. There is some truth to this argument, but it focuses
too much on the intent rather than the result of the procedures. Re-
mittitur has the effect of producing standardized verdicts (within the
"reasonable" range) despite what a jury in a particular case found.
The judge may claim that she is producing a more accurate result, but
that claim of accuracy is not based on the intrinsic value of the claim
but only by reference to a class of claims. The real difference between
the two procedures, then, is that remittitur, at least formally, guaran-
tees a verdict at the higher range of plaintiff's entitlement rather than
an average. Like any judicial decision, this guarantee is subject to
whatever biases about the intrinsic value of the particular claim the
judge may harbor.
250 See Ismail v. Cohen, 899 F.2d 183, 187 (2d Cir. 1996).
251 See supra notes 167-69 (discussing opt-out requirements of bellwether trials).
252 I am grateful to Robert Bone for alerting me to this argument.
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A bellwether trial procedure that utilizes a jury both to determine
the sample verdicts and to determine the overall extrapolation
amounts shows greater fidelity to the jury right than remittitur. The
jury determines the reasonable range of awards that is appropriate for
an extrapolation plaintiff to receive based on sample trials and fur-
thermore can determine how the extrapolation is carried out, such
that its judgment always prevails. The jury can be the decisionmaker
throughout the process. The defendant is guaranteed that the jury's
verdict will never be outside the range of reasonable verdicts, because
the averaging method requires that each extrapolation award stay
within the range of reasonable verdicts reached in the sample trials.
The extrapolation process raises problems under Dimick because
the process is not removing the "excess" from an already existing ver-
dict, but in fact creating an award for each plaintiff consistent with the
sample. If the judge determines the final extrapolation award, as was
proposed in Cimino, the court's judgment is completely substituted
for the jury's. 253 The determinations made by the judge cannot be
compared to what the individual extrapolation plaintiff would have
gotten and thus leaves open the argument that the judge is "adding"
to what the verdict might have been if an individual trial had been
held in each case. To avoid accusations that this process violates the
prohibition on additur in federal court, a jury could determine the ex-
trapolation amounts. A conservative evaluation of this analogy ar-
gues in favor of allocating the extrapolation decision to the jury.
The argument that extrapolation plaintiffs who obtain an award
greater than they would have gotten in an individual trial are in fact
obtaining something in excess of what the jury would have given, and
that this violates the Seventh Amendment just as additur would,
brings us back to the question of probabilistic and particularistic evi-
dence. The probability is not that the award is what this plaintiff
would have gotten at trial. Rather, the award reflects the probable
value of this plaintiffs claim given the distribution of verdicts. The
doctrine of remittitur recognizes that litigants are entitled to a verdict
that is within a reasonable range. Given the inconsistent nature of
jury verdicts, there is no reasonable basis for the argument that either
litigant is entitled to a specific jury verdict. By upholding remittitur,
the Dimick opinion tacitly approves probabilistic reasoning in judicial
evaluation of verdicts.
253 See supra Part L.A (describing the Cimino litigation).
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Moreover, the rejection of additur in federal court places no bur-
den on bellwether trials if the defendant's jury right attaches to the
total compensation award rather than to the compensation of each
individual plaintiff. The defendant is entitled to jury verdicts within
the normal range and, as a due process matter, to an accurate determi-
nation of liability and total compensation. Assuming the statistical
methodology is sound, regardless of the variances among individual
plaintiffs, the overall amount defendant is required to pay under a
bellwether procedure will be equivalent, on the whole, to the amount
that would have been awarded by a jury if each of the individual cases
were tried and the total compensation calculated based on those
results.
Accordingly, the defendant is no worse off in a bellwether trial
procedure than in remittitur. If the procedure is set up as it was in
Hilao, where the jury awarded overall compensation, then the defen-
dant is paying exactly what the jury awarded, no more and no less.254
In some ways the defendant is actually in a better position with re-
spect to bellwether trials than remittitur. In a remittitur situation, the
judge must remit the maximum award that plaintiff could have gotten,
whereas the extrapolation awards will all be within the normal range
and, because they are averaged, all below the maximum amount. The
defendant does not get the advantage of a lottery, but there is also an
advantage in averaging.
The case is different with respect to the extrapolation plaintiffs.
They might argue that they received less in the extrapolation process
than they would have received in an individual jury trial and that
rather than lopping off the "excess," the extrapolation procedure rep-
resents a diminution of their rightful compensation. In this event, the
judge is doing something no different from what occurs in remittitur,
only in a manner that is more accurate and that allows plaintiffs' rep-
resentatives more control over the process. True, any single plaintiff
might have received more (or less) in an individualized jury trial, but
that plaintiff might have received more (or less) if their individual case
was tried to a different jury. There is no support for the proposition
that variations in individual jury trial results with respect to similarly
situated litigants (of which both plaintiffs and defendants take advan-
tage) are a constitutional right. Tolerance of variations in jury awards
indicates that litigants have no right to a specific award but only to an
254 See supra Part I.B (describing the procedure used in Hilao).
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award within a reasonable range and a full and fair procedure for its
determination.
Another objection that an extrapolation plaintiff might make is
that remittitur permits the plaintiff to elect a new trial rather than
acquiescing to the reduced award proposed by the judge. The plaintiff
whose award has been remitted retains his ability to have his award
decided by a jury, whereas in a mandatory bellwether procedure the
extrapolation plaintiff has no such option. For this reason, an opt-out
provision is necessary for bellwether trials not to violate plaintiffs'
jury right as well as their due process rights. As discussed above, per-
mitting an opt-out is not likely to diminish the usefulness of a bell-
wether procedure.255
A recent study indicates that in practice there are few retrials in
remitted cases.256 If the likelihood of relitigation in the remittitur con-
text is low, low too is the likelihood that an opt-out in a bellwether
trial procedure will lead to individual trials. This can be interpreted in
two ways. If remittitur has resulted in an unconstitutional erosion of
the jury right, then bellwether trials will do the same. On the other
hand, by permitting sample trials, the bellwether trial procedure may
result in more jury trials and less substitution of the court's judgment
for that of the jury. Furthermore, it may result in less substitution of
the judgment of attorneys for that of the jury through private mass
settlements.
Like judgments as a matter of law and remittitur, bellwether trial
procedures limit the possible range of jury awards. The difference be-
tween the doctrines is that bellwether trials produce an award that is
an average or probabilistic, whereas (at least theoretically) remittitur
provides the maximum award. But even that maximum award is de-
termined based on a reasonable range and requires the judge to ex-
clude outlier awards and to make probabilistic judgments. Thus,
although there are differences between the two procedures, they also
share important similarities that support the constitutionality of bell-
wether trials.
IV. A Model Bellwether Trial Procedure
In the previous three Parts, this Article laid out the arguments in
favor of bellwether trials and addressed the practical, normative, and
255 See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text (modeling results of an opt-out regime).
256 See Suja A. Thomas, Re-Examining the Constitutionality of Remittitur Under the Seventh
Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 731, 793 (2003) (presenting evidence that "plaintiffs take the re-
mittitur or settle in 98% of the cases in which a judge grants a remittitur").
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constitutional objections to the procedure. This Part describes a
model bellwether trial procedure that is constitutional and realizes the
democratic policy aims of the jury right and the policies animating the
substantive law.
Consistent with the basic requirements of due process, the court
must provide notice to the litigants of the exact nature of the proceed-
ing. It must use recognized social science methods to determine the
sample and the variables that will be considered. For example, the
sample used must be randomly selected and sufficiently large so that
the results are statistically significant. The variables chosen to deline-
ate the parameters of the group to whom the results are to be applied
must be objectively verifiable and shown to be relevant to the jury's
determination. The determination of the sample size, explanatory
variables, and the selection process should be done by an expert who
is as objective as possible. Thus, the expert may not be hired by either
side, although the expert's services perhaps can be paid for by both
sides. A public determination of the soundness of the quantitative
methods used must be required. All the experts' findings and deter-
minations must be made publicly available prior to implementation.
The judge should hold a hearing, evaluate any objections to the ex-
pert's findings, and issue a reasoned opinion.
The plaintiffs must be permitted to opt out before the trial pro-
cess has begun. Although an opt-out is not necessary under a pure
democratic theory of group typical justice, it does provide a positive
gesture for those who adhere to deeply imbedded individualistic tradi-
tion in adjudication by allowing the plaintiffs who want an individual
trial to realize their autonomy. This expression of autonomy may de-
rail the process, but it is necessary for two reasons. First, an opt-out
provides a mechanism for determining whether the procedure as
structured is likely to yield a highly unfair result. If large numbers of
plaintiffs opt out, this is a good indicator of a significant problem.
Second, permitting individuals to opt out allows them to choose a col-
lective procedure and in so doing affirms both the dignity and auton-
omy values that are central to our court system and increases the
legitimacy of the collective procedure. Even if the opt-out is not a
realistic option for many, among the highest-value cases where the
most is at stake there will be some for whom the choice is more than
symbolic.
Some might suggest that the plaintiffs be permitted to opt out
after the extrapolation process has been completed so that the plain-
tiffs can make a fully informed choice. If one believes that there is
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some predictability to jury awards then an end-of-process opt-out
should not be necessary, because the parties can predict what the
likely outcome will be. Permitting plaintiffs to adopt a "wait and see"
attitude and opt out after the procedure has been completed will re-
sult in a substantial waste of resources. As Judge Parker stated in his
opinion approving binding bellwether trials, "[i]f all that is accom-
plished by this is the closing of 169 cases then it was not worth the
effort and will not be repeated. ' 257 Because so much is at stake, bell-
wether trials are likely to be expensive and involve substantial re-
sources of jurors, courts, and litigants. If the structure of the
procedure is predictably unfair, then this must be determined in ad-
vance through opt-outs and judicial review. Of course, after the extra-
polation, plaintiffs will have the right to appeal. Assuming that the
procedure meets due process requirements and is statistically sound,
however, they will lose their ability to have an individual trial since
they did not opt out at the start of the process.
After the parties receive notice, the structure of the sample is set-
tled and the opt-out period has ended, the court will oversee the bell-
wether jury trials. Because the bellwether plaintiffs' results are to be
extrapolated to others, the court should evaluate the lawyers chosen
to represent the bellwether plaintiffs in the individual trials and verify
that they provide adequate representation.2 58 The problem of central-
ization in bellwether trials and the potential for systemic bias that it
engenders requires that more than one jury hear the bellwether cases.
Several different juries ought to decide randomly assigned bellwether
cases. For the same reason, having an expert determine damages and
then bringing the expert's recommendations to a single jury for ratifi-
cation is not the preferable procedure, although it is constitutional.
After the juries have rendered their verdicts, an objective expert
will evaluate the verdicts with reference to the relevant variables and
make extrapolation determinations. In an ideal procedure, a subse-
quent jury would be convened to ratify the experts' extrapolation de-
termination. This second layer of jury participation is beneficial
because it involves democratic decisionmaking on all levels of the pro-
cedure and therefore increases its legitimacy. However, it is also pos-
sible to have the judge, in consultation with an expert, determine the
extrapolation amounts. This would be consistent with the hybrid pro-
cedure described in Part III.C.1 above. The extrapolation would be
257 Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 648, 653 (E.D. Tex. 1990), rev'd, 151 F.3d
297 (5th Cir. 1998).
258 Cf. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(g) (requiring court oversight over appointment of class counsel).
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achieved through averaging, either of the results of all the bellwether
trials or of smaller subgroups chosen based on relevant variables.
Every plaintiff would then be awarded the applicable average amount.
This Article has not addressed several significant technical issues
in implementing bellwether trials with regard to certain mass tort
cases. For example, courts would need to determine whether and how
to bifurcate or trifurcate cases to hold bellwether trials.2 9 The bene-
fits and potential pitfalls of special jury forms would have to be con-
sidered. A court would also need to make a determination regarding
choice of law in the case of a national mass tort.2 60 Finally, the possi-
bility of cherry-picked settlements that scuttle the procedure must be
addressed. These open issues would need to be decided by a court in
any aggregative litigation, including a court contemplating bellwether
trials. In making these determinations, this Article argues that one of
the considerations should be the benefits of making the democratic
body of the jury available to every litigant through the bellwether trial
procedure.
Conclusion
The bellwether trial procedure reintroduces the jury into an area
of law where settlement rules. It injects public, democratic decision-
making into a process that has been almost completely dominated by
private settlement. In so doing, bellwether trials provide a new justifi-
cation for group typical justice grounded in democratic participation
and deliberation.
Courts have been using bellwether trials informally for many
years to provide a basis for settlement between litigants. The develop-
ment of informal bellwether trials is a testament to the procedure's
usefulness. But bellwether trials need not be purely informal. They
can and should be conducted using reliable social science methods,
including random sampling, so that they can provide a valid litigation
alternative to settlement for mass tort cases.261 Whether or not
259 See FED. R. CIv. P. 42(b) (permitting bifurcation); Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 653-54 (tri-
furcating asbestos case into failure-to-warn, causation, and damages phases).
260 See Samuel Issacharoff, Settled Expectations in a World of Unsettled Law: Choice of Law
After the Class Action Fairness Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1839, 1840 (2006) (propounding a
"goods on the national market" theory of choice of law). But see Linda S. Mullenix, Gridlaw:
The Enduring Legacy of Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 74 UMKC L. REV. 651 (2006) (arguing
that choice of law remains a substantial barrier to all class actions and aggregations).
261 See Judith Resnik, Uncovering, Disclosing, and Discovering How the Public Dimensions
of Court-Based Processes Are at Risk, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 521, 568-70 (2006) (arguing in favor
of adjudication as a means of protecting the public dimensions of courts).
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mandatory bellwether trials are actually used routinely, the affirma-
tion of a realistic alternative for litigating mass tort cases will in itself
result in settlements that are more equitable. If they are used to re-
solve mass tort cases directly, bellwether trials will increase citizen
participation in an area of the law that has been the consistent target
of allegations of capture, bias, and abuse.
